Undeniably, there are long standing “problems” between the Zimbabwean and UK authorities but these are spilling over and affecting whether and how soon the UK authorities can deport or remove affected Zimbabwean nationals to Zimbabwe.
The case of JM (Zimbabwe), R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 1773, dealt with several issues, ranging from discussion on the demise of President Mugabe; whether the Home Office could lawfully require the Claimant, under section 35 of the 2004 Act, to tell Zimbabwean officials that he agreed to return voluntarily; whether the claimant’s refusal to sign a disclaimer that he would return to Zimbabwe could be seen as deliberate obstruction rather that a refusal to return voluntarily; whether the Secretary of State can use section 35 serially, “for as many times as it takes”; whether the pursuit of a section 35 prosecution amounted to improper pressure and/or an uncovenanted exercise of the power to detain and whether section 35 can be legitimately used by the Secretary of State both to secure compliance and to justify detention.
The case of Benjamin & Anor, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 1626 (Admin) considers the Surinder Singh principles, both in the context of an entry clearance application for an EEA family permit as well as subsequent attempts to seek to assert a right of entry at port itself.
In Case C-370/90 R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Surinder Singh ex parte SSHD  ECR I-4265, the CJEU held that where a national of one EU Member State exercises an EU law right to work or pursue self-employed activity in another EU Member State, she is entitled (on her return to her “home” Member State) to be joined or accompanied by a spouse who is a third-country national, on terms no more onerous than those that would apply if she were seeking to have her spouse join her in a Member State other than her home Member State.
It has taken all of 3years and 7months for there to be clarification from the higher Courts as regards the correct approach to the reasonableness test in Paragraph 276ADE(1)(iv) of the Immigration Rules. The Court of Appeal’s judgment on the issue in MA (Pakistan) & Ors, R (on the application of) v Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) & Anor  EWCA Civ 705, makes very interesting reading.
You will note from the details I have provided above as regards my name and date of birth that I currently have no leave to remain in the UK. As you will also be aware, I was granted leave to enter as a visitor at Heathrow Airport in 2001, with such leave being valid for 6months at a time when Zimbabwean nationals were not required to obtain prior entry clearance in this category.
In addition to noting that the Court of Appeal has provided yet further guidance in relation to deportation appeals in NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department & Ors  EWCA Civ 662, legal practitioners need to brace themselves for yet further wordplay in relation to newly introduced deportation lingo. We are now familiar with and have grown fairly comfortable with regularly used terms such as, “ a free standing Article 8 analysis” and “ through the lens of the immigration rules”. The Court of Appeal in NA (Pakistan)has gone further; as noted at paragraph 14 of their judgement, when considering the Immigration Rules on deportation, foreign criminals are divided into two categories: those with sentences of between one and four years’ imprisonment and those sentenced to four years or more. The Court of Appeal then decided for the sake of “simplicity”, that the first category shall be referred to as ‘medium offenders’ and the second category as ‘serious offenders’.