Even though S.M.M, had been detained for a period of two and half years and was considered vulnerable as someone suffering from serious mental health problems, nothing much turned upon the issues of the stay on forced removals to Zimbabwe that was in place during his period of detention but most importantly, because of his conduct during the period of detention, the ECHR refused to afford the applicant any financial compensation for the period during which he was found to have been unlawfully detained.
In PAPOSHVILI v. BELGIUM – 41738/10 (Judgment (Merits and Just Satisfaction) : Court (Grand Chamber))  ECHR 1113, the ECHR stated, “The Court concludes from this recapitulation of the case-law that the application of Article 3 of the Convention only in cases where the person facing expulsion is close to death, which has been its practice since the judgment in N. v. the United Kingdom, has deprived aliens who are seriously ill, but whose condition is less critical, of the benefit of that provision. As a corollary to this, the case-law subsequent to N. v. the United Kingdom has not provided more detailed guidance regarding the “very exceptional cases” referred to in N. v. the United Kingdom, other than the case contemplated in D. v. the United Kingdom”.
The outcome in Kiarie and Byndloss, R (on the applications of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 42 (14 June 2017) in the Supreme Court is the epitome of immigration lawyer nirvana. When making deportation orders in Kiarie and Byndloss, the Secretary of State issued Section 94B certificates, the effect of which was that they could bring their appeals only after they had been deported to Kenya and Jamaica. The issue in the two appeals before the Supreme Court was whether the certificates were lawful. Did the certificates breach the rights of the appellants under Article 8 of the ECHR? Unlike the Court of Appeal, the Supreme Court has most sensibly decided that the Section 94B certification procedure is unlawful and unfair.
By not paying proper regard to fundamentals so as to advance a tactful and relevant legal analysis approach from the very start, stemming from the very decision to cease refugee status, the Secretary of State woefully missed out on an opportunity to deport a Zimbabwean national who had never been granted refugee status but rather was conferred it on a technicality for the purposes of family re-unification.
Imagine your first time as an Appellant at an immigration Tribunal hearing venue. What would you expect? Regular refreshments of free tea and biscuits as you wait your turn to be heard by a Judge? After all, you have paid at least £140.00 towards the Tribunal appeal fee. Would you expect to arrive and find 20 or so people crammed in a waiting room with hardly any seating space? What if you are overwhelmed by all this and are too nervous to approach an Usher for updates? Would you simply sit there not knowing what next to expect as the hours go by? Would you anticipate the Usher approaching and addressing you by name since they would have taken your name down from the beginning or would you expect to be addressed en masse along with the rest of the visitors?
“The question is whether there is now general acceptance that these rules are here to stay as unchallengeable/unamendable….”, so enquired my previous blog article of October 2015 in relation to the Rules relating to Adult Dependent Relatives( ADR’s): Adult Dependant Relatives: Very Deliberately Onerous Rules
An ambitious challenge brought about by BRITCITS in BRITCITS v The Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 368 (24 May 2017) has elicited a negative response to the question of whether the ADR Rules can be challenged successfully with a view to striking them down as unlawful. Rather, the Court of Appeal emphasized disappointingly, “ True it is that significantly fewer dependants, including parents, will be able to satisfy the new conditions but that was always the intention”.