“……….It is profoundly unsatisfactory that a set of provisions which was intended to provide clear guidelines to limit the scope for judicial evaluation should have led to such disagreement among some of the most experienced Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal judges. Rather than attempt a detailed analysis of all these impressive but conflicting judgments, I hope I will be forgiven for attempting a simpler and more direct approach. I start with the expectation that the purpose is to produce a straightforward set of rules, and in particular to narrow rather than widen the residual area of discretionary judgment for the court to take account of public interest or other factors not directly reflected in the wording of the statute. I also start from the presumption, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, that the provisions are intended to be consistent with the general principles relating to the “best interests” of children, including the principle that “a child must not be blamed for matters for which he or she is not responsible, such as the conduct of a parent” (see Zoumbas v Secretary of State for the Home Department  UKSC 74,  1 WLR 3690, para 10 per Lord Hodge)”.
The Home Office has for well over a year been angling to throw a spanner in the works so far as continued reliance upon the guidance flowing from AA (Article 15(c)) ( Iraq CG UKUT 544 (IAC) is concerned. The Secretary of State’s general position as set out in currently published Country Information Notes is that the security situation in Iraq has significantly improved. As is clear from those Notes, he has persistently sought to consign to the legal dustbin, the viability of continued reliance upon AA (Iraq )2015.
The Secretary of State’s currently published Information Notes on Iraq have been intended to bury the effect of AA(Iraq)2015, which has opened the doorway to a good number of Iraqi claimants succeeding in the Tribunal in their claims for protection owing to the security conditions in Iraq.