Category Archives: Human Rights

Home Office delays: FLR(FP) applications not subject to a service standard due to COVID-19 pandemic “severe disruption” says the Home Office

Posted on by Standard 2

“I don’t understand……..why is my application taking over 8months to be decided, the Home Office only took 5months to decide the last one?”, so asks an applicant in exasperation, clearly fed-up with the delay in receiving a decision from the Home Office.

Home Office customer service standards for processing applications from those applying to remain on a temporary basis is stated to be 8weeks. Customers applying in the UK for indefinite leave to remain or no time limit (NTL) should expect to have their applications decided within 6months.

Home Office service standard processing times for standard applications (6 months or 8 weeks depending on application type) will start when they receive an application.

Relevant published information also makes it clear: “If there is a problem with your application or if it is complex, we will write to explain why it will not be decided within the normal standard. We will write within the normal processing time for the 8 week standard and within 12 weeks for the 6 month standard. The letter will explain what will happen next”.

Immigration practitioners have ready access to this information and so to do applicants, however with reference to FLR(FP) applications in particular, it is a myth that the Home Office periodically contact applicants with progress updates. Nor do they write in to even acknowledge receipt of a submitted application apart from enabling receipt of a vague general automated email  received upon submission of an online application.

Applicants are simply left to wallow, month following month of deafening silence with chaser correspondence from applicants being largely ignored.

This was the state of affairs for one such applicant until the following response was received a month after an emailed complaint to the Home Office:

“Thank you for your email of 16 February 2021 where you have raised a complaint about the delay in making a decision on your client, Mrs …………’s, application for Further Leave to Remain (FLR).

I am sorry for any frustration, but I am unable to uphold your complaint as the delay has not been down to any maladministration on the part of the business. It will hopefully be helpful if I explain further.

FLR(FP) applications are not presently subject to a service standard. This is due to their potential complexity, relying as they tend to on human rights claims.

All applications are subject to enquiries with other government departments and international organisations to ensure that the statutory requirements have been satisfied, and I would add that the extent and length of time taken to complete these enquiries varies according to the particular circumstance of each application. I am afraid that we are therefore unable to provide a timescale for completion. I would also point out that the COVID-19 pandemic has caused severe disruption to our services, and this has led to further delays which have been down to circumstances beyond our control.

What I can confirm is that Mrs ……..’s current application was submitted prior to her previous grant of leave expiring, and so her application is therefore ‘in time’ and is covered by 3C leave. This means that the conditions of this previous grant of leave will be extended until a decision is made on her current outstanding application. Further guidance on 3C leave can be found here: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/3c-and-3d-leave.

I appreciate that your client may be disappointed that I have been unable to provide a timescale for a decision, but I hope that my response has helped to explain the position.

……………………………………………………”

Substantial fees are required by the Home Office before FLR(FP) applications can be considered (£2612.20 per applicant). The Home Office state there are “severe disruptions” caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. In such circumstances, in the absence of relevant clarifications to this effect on their website, the Home Office should be emailing each and every “customer” so affected instead of maintaining a wall of silence, until provoked into responding.   The current standard  automated confirmation emails received on submission of an online application could contain this information so that applicants are on notice from the beginning that there might be some delays to progression of their applications and that standard service times do not currently apply.

There are most likely much more categories of applicants, including asylum claimants, who have and will see  delays in progression and decision making.

In some cases, the Home Office are also granting leave to remain whilst also indicating within grant letters, that due to the Covid-19 pandemic, passports will be retained until such time as it is possible to return them.

Briefly, in relation to addressing issues, of course a review of such a response as above from the Complaints Unit can be sought however an applicant may also consider approaching their local MP so that MP representations may be made on their behalf, with such action possibly eliciting a decision.

Depending on the circumstances of a case and upon whether an applicant so instructs/wishes, a  PAP letter before claim/action can be sent to the Home Office as a starting point in seeking to challenge by way of judicial review, a delay in decision-making as unlawful.

Before commencement of actual judicial review proceedings, an immigration practitioner should however ensure they are well-versed with the principles and reasoning emanating from the well-known line of cases which have considered issues of maladministration, unlawful delays and damages.

 

 

Home Office updates its Guidance to reflect application of an “Affordability Test” in assessment of Fee Waiver Requests

Posted on by Standard Reply

On 5 March 2021, the Home Office issued a significantly updated Fee Waiver Guidance to reflect a new Affordability Test in the assessment and consideration of fee waiver applications: www.gov.uk/government/publications/applications-for-a-fee-waiver-and-refunds

The Guidance has been updated to reflect that affordability as opposed to destitution is the relevant test, following  the successful challenge outcome in Dzineku-Liggison & Ors, R [2020] UKUT 222  where the Upper Tribunal held that the Secretary of State’s Fee Waiver Guidance, version 3, was unlawful because it failed properly to reflect the settled test, of whether an applicant is able to afford the fee.

The amended Guidance states at page 5:

“Consideration

The sole consideration on whether someone is eligible for a fee waiver is an affordability test to assess whether the individual has credibly demonstrated that they cannot afford the fee. This applies when the applicant does not have sufficient funds at their disposal, after meeting their essential living needs, to pay the fee.

Fee waivers should be granted if the applicant has credibly demonstrated that they meet the affordability test or are destitute or at imminent risk of destitution.

The need to safeguard and promote the welfare of a child in the UK should be a primary consideration in deciding any claim. This means careful consideration needs to be given as to whether the applicant is unable to meet the essential further needs of a child and whether being required to pay the fee would deprive the child of having these needs met.

Evidence

 Evidential flexibility should only be applied to an application for a fee waiver in exceptional circumstances, where the caseworker is satisfied that there is clear and compelling evidence that the individual will not be able to afford the fee or if there is a compelling reason why the evidence cannot be provided”.

The Guidance continues at page 10:

“Assessing a fee waiver

Applicants for a fee waiver must be seeking leave to remain in one of the specified human rights routes set out above and have a substantive basis for being considered for a grant of such leave.

A fee waiver must be granted if the applicant is assessed and found:

  • to credibly demonstrate they cannot afford the fee, or
  • to be destitute, or
  • at risk of imminent destitution, or
  • their income is not sufficient to meet their child’s particular and essential additional needs”.

Affordability Test:

The Guidance proceeds to clarify the application of the Affordability Test at page 11:

“The applicant cannot afford the fee

When assessing an application, consideration must be given to whether the applicant has credibly demonstrated that they cannot afford the fee.

An applicant is considered unable to pay the fee when they do not have sufficient funds at their disposal after meeting essential living needs such as housing and food. This applies independently of whether the applicant is destitute or at risk of destitution.

It is possible for an applicant to be provided with accommodation and essential living needs by others and be in a situation where they can credibly demonstrate they cannot afford the fee. This could include support from family and friends, a charity or NGO, or the local authority or through the Asylum Support Regulations.

You should carefully consider whether the individual has spent in excess of their essential living needs and whether they have any savings. This is to ensure that only those who genuinely cannot afford the fee or have not had the ability to save for the foreseeable fee qualify for a fee waiver.

Using the information provided, the application needs to be addressed in the following way:

  1. Are you satisfied that the applicant is either destitute nor at risk of imminent destitution?
  2. Does the applicant pay for their accommodation?
  3. How are they meeting their essential living needs? (I.e. do they pay for them/are they donated? If so, from whom?).
  4. What sources of income do they have?
  5. Have they provided evidence of sources of income, including details of all bank accounts that they and their partner hold (if not, these details must be requested)?
  6. Does the applicant have sufficient surplus income, excluding accommodation and essential living needs, to afford the fee?
  7. Has the applicant made any non-essential and excessive purchases, such as money spent on holidays, gambling or other non-essential purchases?
  8. Is the information provided, even if not complete, sufficient to indicate that evidential flexibility, as described above, should be applied?
  9. Do they have sufficient savings to pay the fee?

This affordability test seeks to assess the amount of income and savings available once accommodation and essential living needs for the applicant and any dependants have been met.

The total amount of resource available to the applicant must be considered, including any savings the individual may have. This should be applied to the total amount required by the applicant to pay for their application and the applications of any dependants”.

  • Tip: address the above questions in advance in detail as applicable within representations or a letter/statement of explanation, including relevant supportive evidence. It is better to prepare effectively in advance rather than seek to source other evidence only in response to Home office questions to be responded to within a tight deadline.
  • Tip: where “significant” sums of money appear as transaction in and out of a relevant bank account, clarify in relation to each such amount, where the funds came from, when and how the funds were used and why it was essential or relevant to incur that expense. If the sums of money do not emanate from employment or public funds, and are perhaps a loan, explain to that effect and provide evidence. If it is a private loan from a friend or relative, seek to obtain a letter from them clarifying how much was given to the applicant, why the funds were loaned, when and how the funds were given, whether the applicant has started paying back the loan or when it is expected they will start to do so.
  • Tip: provide all bank account details for all relevant persons residing at the accommodation. The Home Office will carry out a credit check etc. If a relative, such as an adult child, no longer resides at the residence but uses the family address to receive their correspondence such as bank statements for privacy issues etc, the relative should provide a letter explaining these circumstances, stating when and why they moved out of the residence and confirm they are no longer  part of the household and do not receive or provide financial support to any one at the accommodation.
  • Tip: in relation to having savings, a very recent blog post of 1st March 2021 indicates, depending on the circumstances this is no bar to submission of a fee waiver request and a successful outcome might be forthcoming: ukimmigrationjusticewatch.com/2021/03/01/it-is-possible-to-obtain-a-fee-waiver-with-income-of-3000-a-month-plus-substantial-savings-in-the-family-household/. As recently as 5 March 2021, the date of publication of the new Guidance, a single mother applicant in employment with a British child but with savings of £2500 was granted a fee waiver as credible clarifications were provided in advance in relation to the savings.

Assessing whether income is not sufficient to meet the Applicant’s child’s particular and essential additional needs:

In assessing whether an applicant’s income is not sufficient to meet their child’s particular and essential additional needs, the Guidance provides at pages 13 to 14  that consideration will be given to the following:

“Although the needs of children may implicitly have been considered in earlier stages of the request for a fee waiver, this part addresses them directly.

The duty in section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 to have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of a child in the UK means that consideration of the child’s best interests, which can also be expressed as the child’s well-being, must be a primary consideration, but not the only consideration, in carrying out immigration functions that affect them.

The following questions, in addition to the earlier questions, are relevant to assessing if the request should be granted because the applicant is faced with:

  • meeting the further essential needs of a child or children, and is unable to do so on account of their low income, and/or
  • being required to find the amount necessary for the fee would deprive the child of having these further needs met.

It is also important to understand if the child is supported only by one parent or by both.

Questions to consider when assessing an application in relation to children:

  1. Does the applicant have children?
  2. Do the children live with both parents or with only one parent?
  3. Do both parents provide support or only one parent?
  4. Has the absent parent ever provided support?
  5. What impact will paying the fees have, given the parent’s low income, on the ability of the child to enjoy or maintain full participation in school activities?
  6. If it will have an impact, which are the activities in which the child cannot participate (private lessons and activities not provided by the school are not included unless part of a plan approved by the school)?
  7. Does the child have further needs based on a protected characteristic, such as extra travel costs through participating, additionally to the parent, in a faith or other centre providing for children and young people, or does the child have needs based on making adjustments for a disability?

The purpose of this consideration is to assess whether a fee waiver rejection would have a disproportionate impact on the child’s well-being or best interests.

The question is not whether a fee waiver would make more money available to a parent that may then be spent on a child. It is whether paying the fee would lead to the child experiencing a lower level of well-being than they currently enjoy, being deprived of something they currently enjoy, or not having access to a specific item or items of recognised benefit”.

  • Tip: the Home Office at times pose questions during the consideration of a fee waiver application. Where the other parent does not live with the applicant and does not make any financial provision for the child, a question might arise as to why  arrangements have not been made to claim child maintenance. A paragraph or two  within representations addressing this issue should be advanced to the Home Office instead of  waiting  to have an already stressed applicant being put on the defensive by a subsequent question in this regards from the Home Office.
  • Tip: where there is a child living with the applicant, representations and any supportive documentary evidence addressing the above questions, where applicable, should be the norm rather than dealing with a barrage of questions later on from the Home Office within a short given deadline.

If a fee waiver request is refused- Section 3c leave and applicants who had leave to remain at the time of making a fee waiver request:

Page 22 of the Guidance provides that 10working days is given to make a paid leave to remain application if a fee waiver application is refused:

“For in time applications

  • if the applicant made their request for a fee waiver in time (for example they had valid leave on the date their application was submitted), they should normally be told of a decision that they do not qualify for a fee waiver. If any additional evidence is requested they should be told to submit that in order to demonstrate they can qualify for a fee waiver. They must, within 10 working days of the decision being dispatched, submit this additional evidence that demonstrates they qualify for a fee waiver.
  • if additional evidence is provided within that period that demonstrates the applicant qualifies for a fee waiver, the applicant is issued with a fee waiver token that enables them to apply for a fee free immigration application. The applicant has 10 working days to make an LTR application and, where relevant, to benefit from 3C leave.
  • if the applicant provides further evidence within 10 working days but this does not demonstrate that they qualify for a fee waiver or if they do not provide any further evidence within 10 working days, the application should be rejected as invalid. In either of these scenarios the applicant has 10 working days to make a paid LTR application and to benefit, where relevant, from any 3C leave. If a paid application is not made within 10 working days, and the applicant’s leave has expired there can be no capacity to benefit from 3C leave”.

Date on which a leave application is made –  in time applicants, fee waiver grants and preserving Section 3C leave:

Paragraph 34G of the Immigration Rules states:

“34G. For the purposes of these rules, the date on which an application (or a variation of application in accordance with paragraph 34E is made is:

……………………

(3) where the application is made via the online application process, and there is no request for a fee waiver, the date on which the online application is submitted; or

(4) where the online application includes a request for a fee waiver, the date on which the online request for a fee waiver is submitted, as long as the completed application for leave to remain is submitted within 10 days of the receipt of the decision on the fee waiver application”.

Page 3 of the Guidance provides clarification in this regards:

“…………………….

Requests for a fee waiver made by those who have current Leave to Remain, and whose leave expires whilst their fee waiver request is being considered, will be allowed 10 working days from the actual date of their fee waiver decision to submit an application for Leave to Remain or Further Leave to Remain. After this, their leave will be treated as expired.

If an individual has legal leave or has submitted the fee waiver request before their leave has expired, they are not required to apply for Leave to Remain until after the outcome of their fee waiver application.

Requests for a fee waiver made by those without current Leave to Remain mean that the applicant will not be able to benefit from the 10 working days period allowed above.”

For in-time applicants, it is very important that a leave to remain application is made within the 10working days from the actual date of grant of the fee waiver in order to retain Section 3c leave. Lack of preservation of an applicant’s section 3C leave means entitlement to work or claim benefits whilst a leave application is pending to be decided, will cease.

Example: an applicant whose leave to remain expires on 10 March 2021 submits a fee waiver request on 5 March 2021, before their leave expires. The fee waiver request is granted on 19 March 2021. So long as the leave to remain application is validly completed and submitted online  by 1st April 2021, the applicant will retain Section 3c leave.

Since the contents of a completed online fee waiver application duplicate to a good extent what will be required for completion, say in a FLR(FP) Form, it is prudent, where an online application has not already been completed, to submit the leave to remain application within the same week of receipt of the fee waiver grant.

Further clarification on the relevant date of submission of the leave to remain application can be gleaned from:

“”Requesting a fee waiver

 ……………………………

 If you make a fee waiver request before your current leave expires, and then you make an application for leave to remain, the date of that application will be the date you submitted the fee waiver request. If you make a fee waiver request and you have no leave or your current leave has expired and then submit an application for leave to remain, the date of application will be the date you submit that application for leave to remain, not the date you submitted the fee waiver request”-www.visas-immigration.service.gov.uk/product/fee-waiver?_ga=2.202470678.647032866.1615054021-731661406.1585333230

Example: an applicant whose leave to remain expires on 10 March 2021 submits a fee waiver request on 5 March 2021, before their leave expires. The fee waiver request is granted on 19 March 2021. Such a person will be treated as having submitted their leave to remain application on 5 March 2021 so long as the completed application for leave to remain is submitted within 10working days of receipt of the decision on the fee waiver application, i.e so long as the leave application is completed and submitted online by 1st April 2021, the date of the leave to remain application will be 5 March 2021.

 

 

Top Tip: circumstances in which you can submit your private and family life claim without paying any Home Office fees or submit a fee waiver application

Posted on by Standard Reply

Paragraph 34 of the Immigration Rules provides the requirements to be met in order for an application for leave to remain based on private and family life to be valid.  An invalid application can be rejected unconsidered by the Home Office.

Two of the “mandatory” requirements are that the applicable Home Office application fee be paid ( currently £1033.00 plus biometrics enrolment fee of £19.20 per applicant) as well as the Immigration Health Surcharge (£1560.00 per applicant).

Under GEN.1.9. of Appendix FM, a valid application is not required when the Article 8 family or private life claim is raised:

  • as part of an asylum claim, or
  • as part of a further submission in person after an asylum claim has been refused, or
  • where a migrant is in immigration detention- a migrant in immigration detention or their representative must submit any application or claim raising Article 8 to a prison officer, a prisoner custody officer, a detainee custody officer or a member of Home Office staff at the migrant’s place of detention, or
  • in an appeal (subject to the consent of the Secretary of State where applicable)

For example:

  • An undocumented parent with a child who has resided in the UK continuously for at least 7years may claim asylum, say, on the basis that they fear return to their country of origin having engaged in a “mixed” marriage in the UK. Upon the Home Office making a decision on the asylum claim, Paragraph 276ADE(1)(iv) of the Immigration Rules will also be considered in relation to the child’s private life in the UK based on the 7year Rule. Where evidence of continuous residence is submitted and the “reasonableness test” is satisfied in relation to the child, as well as the Suitability criteria, leave to remain may be granted ultimately to the family on a 10year route to settlement if the asylum claim does not succeed.
  • A failed asylum seeker may rely upon Paragraph 276ADE(1) (iii) of the Immigration Rules placing reliance on 20years continuous residence in the UK. Instead of submitting an online application and paying Home Office fees, such a person may rely on the Further Submissions procedure and make an appointment to submit their application package in person at UKVI Liverpool(current procedure however due to the  Covid – 19 pandemic, is that Further Submissions are to be submitted via email or by post).
  • A failed asylum seeker may have a British child, either due to the child obtaining registration as British having been born and resided in the UK for 10years or due to the child being British arising out of the applicant’s partner being British or settled in the UK.  The failed asylum seeker applicant may rely on their family life with their British citizen Partner and British Child as a basis of stay in the UK via the Further Submissions Procedure.
  • An applicant‘s asylum or human rights claim may have been refused by the Home Office however during the course of the appeal and before the appeal is heard, the appellant gives birth to a British child.  The appellant may rely on the birth of their child as a new matter. A new matter is a human rights or protection claim that the Home Office has not previously considered in the decision under appeal or a response to a section 120 notice. However for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction in hearing the appeal on this issue, the Home Office must give consent to the new matter being adjudicated upon by the Tribunal Judge during the course of the appeal.

All this means that applicants whose circumstances fall into the above categories do not have to complete any online application form, nor make provision for Home Office fees. They should however provide written representations as to why they should be granted leave to remain in the UK and provide relevant  supportive documents/evidence.

It is possible to obtain a Fee Waiver with income of £3000 a month plus substantial savings in the family household

Posted on by Standard Reply

 

In relation to Home Office application fees, an applicant’s first thought should be, “how will I qualify for a fee waiver?” rather than, “where will I obtain the money to pay for my application fees?”.

There is no reason why a person applying for leave to remain on human rights grounds should make provision of Home Office application fees where the requirements of the Home Office’s Fee Waiver Guidance appear capable of being met.

The fact that an applicant is in employment and has savings is no bar to submitting a fee waiver request.

There should be no hesitation in requesting a fee waiver where an applicant has a partner and they are both in employment.

An applicant in the UK, with a bank account held for example in Nigeria, having a non- UK based husband living and working in Nigeria, can apply for a fee waiver.

Evidential Flexibility

There can be several reasons why an applicant may not wish to avail themselves of the fee waiver procedure:  transactions appearing in provided bank accounts statements may in themselves give an account which may require clarifications from an applicant in relation to either source of income or the presence of savings adequate to cover the required application fees.

Relatively new Guidance on fee waivers published in June 2020 now provides for evidential flexibility with the following issues also relevant for consideration:

“A fee waiver may be granted if the applicant is assessed and it is found that any of the following apply:

  • they are not able to pay the fee
  • they are destitute
  • they are at risk of imminent destitution
  • their income is not sufficient to meet a child’s particular and additional needs
  • they are faced with exceptional financial circumstances”

In relation to evidential flexibility, the Guidance now helpfully states:

“Whilst the onus is on the applicant to provide sufficient evidence for the fee waiver to be granted there will be some cases where providing evidence is more difficult than in others. Among these cases will be some where it is foreseeable that repeated requests to the applicant to provide evidence may not result in further relevant information being produced because the initial statement of circumstances indicates that further documentary evidence does not exist or cannot reasonably be provided by the applicant because it is not available to them.

Evidential flexibility means that the decision maker can grant the fee waiver without seeking further additional evidence or documentation if they are satisfied that reasonable evidence has been provided in the round as to the applicant’s circumstances and that, without a fee waiver, the applicant will not be able to apply for leave to remain.

Situations in which the decision maker may be flexible in requiring further additional evidence are as follows:

  • the applicant is a single parent and restricted in seeking and taking employment due to the need to look after children (this includes both pre-school children and children who can no longer attend a school due to COVID-19 restrictions)
  • cases where eviction notices have been issued, or eviction has actually taken place
  • cases where family, friends, or an identifiable organisation is providing essential living needs, e.g. a charity or food bank, and the applicant has no other means of being provided with essential living needs
  • the applicant is the parent or main guardian of a child who is not attending school because of COVID-19 concerns
  • there is evidence of vulnerability related to pregnancy, a long-term health condition, disability, or mental illness – this includes dependants as well as the applicant

There is no automatic presumption that an application will be successful, but if the case meets any of the conditions set out above, the effect of that will be to require the decision maker to consider if further information and evidence is necessary. Although the above list is not exhaustive it is not expected that there will be many other types of cases where evidential flexibility will be appropriate. Each case should still be considered on its own individual merits. Whether to apply evidential flexibility can still be outweighed by other relevant matters, including the intentional disposal of funds and other countervailing evidence”.

Example outcomes of fee waiver applications

Single mother with monthly income of £3000 and savings of £4450 in the household:

A single mother in part – time employment earning £691.91 a month seeks to submit a fee waiver request prior to making an extension application for permission to stay as a parent.

She receives public funds, including child benefit, Carer’s Allowance, Disability Living Allowance in relation to her British child including working tax credits totalling  £2316.41 month.

She also receives £30.00 a month from the father of her British child.

The total monthly income is £3038.32.

In relation to the applicant’s outgoings, these are £3012.12 monthly.

The fee waiver request form asks for details of household income and assets. This includes income and assets belonging to an applicant’s spouse or partner, (as well as any other adult with whom the applicant lives and from whom they receive financial support) and to their children and any other dependants.

Not only are the applicant’s bank account statements provided but also those of her children.

The British child’s bank account has funds of £3550.00.

Her other dependant child, for the purposes of the leave to remain application, has funds of £900.00 in his bank account.

As regards the total funds of £4450.00 in the children’s bank accounts, representations are made regarding the children’s evidenced medical conditions, pending family court proceedings which are expected to require the services of a family solicitor on a private paying basis  as well as the future expenses the family is expected to incur in moving to larger council accommodation. The Home Office decision maker is also requested to take into account the children ‘s best interests.

Outcome: fee waiver is granted within a matter of days of uploading representations and supportive evidence.

Applicant and British partner working in the UK:

Applicant seeks to extend her leave having initially been granted leave to remain as the parent of a British citizen child. She also has an older dependant child who is under the age of 18 who lives with her and is to be included in the leave to remain application.

Applicant earns £950.00 a month.

She has a new partner and since he is part of her household, his earnings of £2400. 00 a month are disclosed to the Home Office.

£140 a month is received in relation to the applicant’s British child.

The total income of the household is £3490.00 a month.

£700 remains from the income after the expenses of the household are considered.

Outcome: fee waiver request is granted without further enquiries from the Home Office.

Applicant with a bank account in Nigeria with husband living and working in Nigeria:

The Applicant came to the UK on a visit visa.

She intends to submit a leave to remain application following the outcome of a fee waiver request.

She receives the equivalent of £150 a month from her husband( who has never been  to the UK but lives and works in Nigeria earning the equivalent of £1200 a month).  The applicant is temporarily accommodated by social services on an emergency basis  as she also has her Nigerian child with her in the UK.

The expenses of the household in Nigeria including the husband’s bank statements, his payslip as well as amount of rent paid each month in Nigeria are provided.

Currency converter, www1.oanda.com/currency/converter/, is utilised to work out the exact income and expenses in Nigeria.

Outcome: fee waiver request is granted in less than two weeks.

 

Conclusion

In situations where it might appear on the surface that submission of a fee waiver request is an exercise in futility, it is important to obtain relevant legal advice perhaps a few weeks prior to the expiry of any leave to remain(a fee waiver application is required to be submitted in advance of the substantive leave to remain application).

It is often the case that an effectively prepared fee waiver request will take up much more time in preparation than the leave to remain application itself however there are substantial savings to be made where a fee waiver is granted- it is clear that none of the applicants in the above scenarios had to part with  the £5224.40 that would otherwise have been required by the Home Office in each of their circumstances.

 

How to avoid paying Home Office application fees

Posted on by Standard Reply

 

 

It goes without saying that from the minute an applicant is granted limited leave to remain in the UK, they are from that moment onwards, in practical effect already in debt to the Home Office.

This is because on next seeking to extend their leave, the Home Office will ordinarily require provision of substantial application fees so as to accept an application as validly submitted and deserving of consideration.

For applicants without savings and in considerable financial straits, the way forward is usually:

  • a delay in submission of the extension leave application, thereby remaining in the UK without leave, ie becoming an overstayer, until such time as the required funds are raised
  • non – submission of the application, resulting in the individual likely eventually coming to the attention of immigration enforcement
  • submission of an application by the applicant and their spouse but leaving one or two child family members out of the equation
  • borrowing of funds from friends or family
  • falling into debt by providing the application fees but unable to fund other necessary financial obligations relevant to the effective running of the household

There are however several ways that applicants may utilise, as provided for in Home office Guidance or Rules, to completely side- step the charging provisions and obtain a consideration of their applications by the Home Office.

The following free of charge procedures are available to eligible applicants:

  • Fee Waiver application process
  • Further Submissions procedure
  • Representations from an applicant detained under immigration powers
  • Red.0002 (enforcement non-charged) Section 120 Notice procedure(where the Notice is served by the Home Office)

FEES REQUIRED BY THE HOME OFFICE

Application fees and forms are set out here – https://www.gov.uk/topic/immigration-operational-guidance/fees-forms

Currently, the Home Office require £1033.00 application fees per applicant or dependant for leave to remain applications, such as FLR(FP) applications.

A biometrics enrolment fee of £19. 20 per person will be collected online at the same time as payment of the application fee is made.

For an FLR(FP) application for example, the Immigration Health Surcharge payable per person is £1560.00.

Taking the above figures into account, a family unit consisting of parents and two children will be required by the Home Office to provide a total of £10,448.80 in relation to an FLR(FP) initial or extension application.

FEE WAIVER APPLICATION PROCEDURE

Applying for a fee waiver is one of the main procedures relied upon by applicants to obtain exemption from paying Home Office applications fees and the health surcharge.

Guidance Fee waiver: Human Rights-based and other specified applications  instructs Home office decision makers how to consider applications for a fee waiver from applicants making a specified human rights application and where to require payment of the fee before deciding the application would be incompatible with a person’s rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The fee waiver policy also applies to applications from victims of trafficking who seek to extend their leave to remain in certain circumstances.

Types of applications covered by the Guidance

The guidance applies to the following types of application:

  • applications for leave to remain under the 5-year partner route from applicants who are not required to meet the minimum income threshold because their sponsor is in receipt of one or more specified benefits and who instead must demonstrate that their sponsor can provide adequate maintenance
  • applications for leave to remain under the 5-year parent route
  • applications for leave to remain under the 10-year partner, parent or private life route, where the applicant claims that refusal of that application for leave to remain would breach their rights (or the rights of other specified persons) under ECHR Article 8 (the right to respect for private and family life)
  • applications for leave to remain on the basis of other ECHR rights
  • applications for further leave to remain from applicants granted discretionary leave (DL) following refusal of asylum or humanitarian protection, where the applicant claims that refusal to grant further leave to remain would breach their ECHR rights
  • applications for further DL from victims of trafficking or slavery who have had a positive conclusive grounds decision from a competent authority of the national referral mechanism (NRM), have already accrued

There is no fee waiver available for applicants for leave to remain under the 5-year partner route whose sponsor is not in receipt of one or more of the benefits specified at paragraph E-LTRP.3.3. of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules. Such an applicant must meet the minimum income threshold and so they are not eligible for a fee waiver.

Applications for Indefinite Leave to Remain(ILR) are not covered by the fee waiver policy. ILR applications need to be accompanied by the correct fee in order to be considered.

Basis of grant of a fee waiver application

A fee waiver may be granted if the applicant is assessed and it is found that any of the following apply:

  • they are not able to pay the fee
  • they are destitute
  • they are at risk of imminent destitution
  • their income is not sufficient to meet a child’s particular and additional needs
  • they are faced with exceptional financial circumstances

Documentary Evidence

The assessment of whether the applicant qualifies for a fee waiver will be made on the basis of their own individual circumstances and those of any dependent family members. The onus is on the applicant to demonstrate that they qualify for a fee waiver. The applicant must provide relevant documentation to evidence their fee waiver application, including detailed evidence as to their financial circumstances.

For example,  Home Office caseworkers will normally expect to see information and evidence relating to the applicant’s income, their accommodation, the type and adequacy of this, and the amount of their rent/ mortgage or of their contribution towards this, and their outgoings in terms of spending on things like food, utility bills. This information should be supported by independent evidence, such as their pay slips, bank statements, tenancy agreement, utility bills. The nature of the evidence provided will vary depending on the individual circumstances of the applicant, but the Home Office will expect to see evidence appropriate to the circumstances that are being claimed.

Evidential flexibility and fee waiver applications

Whilst the onus is on the applicant to provide sufficient evidence for the fee waiver to be granted, the Home Office appreciate that there will be some cases where providing evidence is more difficult than in others.

Among the cases will be some where it is foreseeable that repeated requests to the applicant to provide evidence may not result in further relevant information being produced because the initial statement of circumstances indicates that further documentary evidence does not exist or cannot reasonably be provided by the applicant because it is not available to them.

Evidential flexibility means that the decision maker can grant the fee waiver without seeking further additional evidence or documentation if they are satisfied that reasonable evidence has been provided in the round as to the applicant’s circumstances and that, without a fee waiver, the applicant will not be able to apply for leave to remain.

Situations in which the decision maker may be flexible in requiring further additional evidence are as follows:

  • the applicant is a single parent and restricted in seeking and taking employment due to the need to look after children (this includes both pre-school children and children who can no longer attend a school due to COVID-19 restrictions)
  • cases where eviction notices have been issued, or eviction has actually taken place
  • cases where family, friends, or an identifiable organisation is providing essential living needs, e.g. a charity or food bank, and the applicant has no other means of being provided with essential living needs
  • the applicant is the parent or main guardian of a child who is not attending school because of COVID-19 concerns
  • there is evidence of vulnerability related to pregnancy, a long-term health condition, disability, or mental illness – this includes dependants as well as the applicant.

There is no automatic presumption that an application will be successful, but if the case meets any of the conditions set out above, the effect of that will be to require the decision maker to consider if further information and evidence is necessary.

Although the above list is not exhaustive, the Home Office state that it is not expected that there will be many other types of cases where evidential flexibility will be appropriate. Each case will still be considered on its own individual merits.

Whether to apply evidential flexibility can still be outweighed by other relevant matters, including the intentional disposal of funds and other countervailing evidence.

Grant of Fee Waiver

An applicant will be required to submit an online fee waiver form in advance of the substantive leave to remain application.

When applying for a fee waiver the applicant will be asked to provide details of their financial circumstances. This will mainly be in the form of statements covering the 6 months period prior to the date of application for all bank or building society accounts they hold, and a full breakdown of their monthly income and expenditure at the time of application

If an applicant is granted a fee waiver they will be issued with a Unique Reference Number(URN) to be used when applying for  leave to  remain online. This electronic pass  allows applicants  to complete and submit the substantive application form for leave to remain and proceed without paying Home office application fees.

The substantive application must be submitted within 10 working days of the date of the decision to grant the waiver.

The applicant must then make a Service and Support Centre appointment within 17 working days. Failure to do this could result in the URN no longer being valid and a new fee waiver application may be required.

Date of substantive application if fee waiver is granted

If an applicant makes a fee waiver request before their current leave expires, and then they make an application for leave to remain, the date of that application will be the date the applicant submitted the fee waiver request.

If an applicant makes a fee waiver request and they have no leave or their current leave has expired and then submit an application for leave to remain, the date of application will be the date they submit that application for leave to remain, not the date they submitted the fee waiver request.

Refusal of fee waiver application

A fee waiver decision is not subject to a reconsideration request as it is not an immigration decision. A decision will be made on the basis of the information set out in the application and any supplementary information about the applicant’s circumstances which they provide in support of their application.

Online applicants without a fee waiver or refused a fee waive will have to submit the relevant fee in order to proceed with submission of their leave application.

It is also open for an applicant to make a further request for a fee waiver.

Fee Waiver applications submitted by applicants holding valid leave to remain

Requests for a fee waiver made by those who have current Leave to Remain, and whose leave expires whilst their fee waiver request is being considered, will be allowed 10 days from the actual date of their fee waiver decision to submit an application for Leave to Remain or Further Leave to Remain. After this, their leave will be treated as expired.

Requests for a fee waiver made by those without current Leave to Remain mean that the applicant will not be able to benefit from the 10 days period allowed above.

Travel Assistance

Applicants who have been granted a fee waiver and who fit any of the following criteria may be eligible to apply for travel assistance to attend their closest Service and Support Centre:

  • in receipt of asylum support or Local Authority support
  • Domestic Violence customers
  • a responsible adult attending an appointment with a child in social care
  • anyone where paying for travel would render them destitute
  • where travel is over 3 miles

FAILED ASYLUM SEEKERS AND FURTHER SUBMISSIONS PROCEDURE

There is no apparent reason why failed asylum seekers should not take advantage of the further submissions procedure and submit fresh claims based on human rights, ie Article 3( medical conditions) and Article 8 of the ECHR(right to private and family life).

The further submissions procedure does not require payment of application fees. Further representations and supportive evidence can be submitted and considered by the Home Office free of charge.

Guidance Asylum policy instruction: further submissions explains the policy, process and procedure which must be followed when considering further submissions following the refusal of an asylum or human rights claim, or where an asylum claim has been withdrawn or treated as withdrawn under paragraph 333C of the Immigration Rules. It applies to asylum or human rights based further submissions and covers:

  • the process for making asylum and human rights based further submissions
  • circumstances in which those lodging further submissions may be detained under immigration detention powers
  • considering evidence provided as further submissions
  • how to apply paragraph 353 of the Immigration Rules

What is a fresh claim?

Home Office Caseworkers only need to decide if further submissions amount to a fresh claim on asylum or human rights grounds when they have already considered the additional evidence provided, and decided not to grant any leave. In such cases,  the caseworker will be required to then consider whether the further submissions amount to a fresh claim. The claimant will only be entitled to an in-country right of appeal if it is accepted that there is a fresh claim.

Paragraph 353 states that submissions will amount to a fresh claim if they are significantly different from material that has already been considered. Submissions will only be significantly different if the content:

  • has not already been considered; and
  • taken together with previously considered material, creates a realistic prospect of success before the Tribunal on protection or human rights grounds, including claims under Article 8 ECHR (which will be considered under the Family or Private Life Rules, where appropriate)

Covid-19 Pandemic: submission by email or post

Prior to the first lockdown on 23rd March 2020, there  was a requirement in the majority of cases for persons wishing to provide further submissions to the Home Office, to book an advance appointment and attend at Liverpool Home Office to present representations and supportive evidence.

Because of coronavirus (COVID-19), applicants cannot currently submit their evidence in person.

The applicable procedure is presentation of further submissions in one of two ways:

Email to:

Refused Case Management Further Submissions Unit

CSUEC@homeoffice.gov.uk

By Post to:

Refused Case Management Further Submissions Unit
Level 7
The Capital Building
Old Hall Street
Liverpool
L3 9PP

Applicants are required to Download and fill in the further submissions form and email or post it to the Refused Case Management team.

Together with the further submissions, applicants are advised to include copies or photos of the following documents (if they have them) to prove their identity:

  • valid passport
  • IS96/Bail Form 201 with photograph
  • previous immigration status document
  • driving licence (if the applicant has already submitted a photo of themselves)

Pre Covid 19: suspended further submissions appointment procedure at Liverpool Home office

Prior to March 2020, all further submissions following the refusal of asylum or humanitarian protection had to be made in person at the Further Submissions Unit (FSU) in Liverpool. Claimants were required make an appointment to attend the FSU unless they fell into one of the exceptional categories.

The Liverpool appointments procedure may still continue to apply after lockdown.

The FSU operates an appointment only system. To make an appointment, individuals were required to contact the FSU (the telephone number is 0151 213 2411). The FSU would then send written confirmation of the appointment (by letter or e-mail) to the individual, including the address of the FSU and a link to the form on the Gov.UK website.

Claimants were required complete the form and bring it to their appointment in Liverpool, along with supportive documentation and representations including:

  • a completed Further Submissions form detailing the additional information the claimant would like the Home Office to consider
  • supporting documents, including, where available, any Reasons For Refusal Letters (RFRLs) or appeal determinations
  • application Registration Card (ARC) if still in possession of this
  • passport (of the claimant and all dependants in the UK, if not with the Home Office)
  • Evidence of family life in the UK (for family or private life based submissions)
  • Police Registration Certificates (if held)
  • any other Identity documents (if held)
  • 4 un-separated passport-sized photographs (of the claimant and any dependants)
  • evidence of accommodation (if not provided by the Home Office)
  • any other documents relevant to the claim

SUBMMISSION OF REPRESENTATIONS BY DETAINED APPLICANTS

The circumstances in which the requirement to submit a valid application will not be applied are set out in paragraph 276A0 of the Immigration Rules and in paragraph GEN 1.9 of Appendix FM of those Rules.

Submission of a valid application necessarily requires submission of a specified application form and fees, however as will be evident below, where Paragraph 276A0 and GEN 1.9 apply, no such application form or fees need be provided by an applicant.

Paragraph GEN 1.9 of Appendix FM

Paragraph GEN 1.9 of Appendix FM states:

“GEN.1.9. In this Appendix:

(a) the requirement to make a valid application will not apply when the Article 8 claim is raised:

(i) as part of an asylum claim, or as part of a further submission in person after an asylum claim has been refused;

(ii) where a migrant is in immigration detention. A migrant in immigration detention or their representative must submit any application or claim raising Article 8 to a prison officer, a prisoner custody officer, a detainee custody officer or a member of Home Office staff at the migrant’s place of detention; or

(iii) in an appeal (subject to the consent of the Secretary of State where applicable); and

(b) where an application or claim raising Article 8 is made in any of the circumstances specified in paragraph GEN.1.9.(a), or is considered by the Secretary of State under paragraph A277C of these rules, the requirements of paragraphs R-LTRP.1.1.(c) and R-LTRPT.1.1.(c) are not met”.

Paragraph 276A0 of the Immigration Rules

Paragraph 276A0 of the Immigration Rules provides:

“276A0. For the purposes of paragraph 276ADE(1) the requirement to make a valid application will not apply when the Article 8 claim is raised:

(i) as part of an asylum claim, or as part of a further submission in person after an asylum claim has been refused;

(ii) where a migrant is in immigration detention. A migrant in immigration detention or their representative must submit any application or claim raising Article 8 to a prison officer, a prisoner custody officer, a detainee custody officer or a member of Home Office staff at the migrant’s place of detention; or

(iii) in an appeal (subject to the consent of the Secretary of State where applicable)”.

Paragraphs 276ADE enables applicants to place reliance on their private life in the UK having regard to the 20year Rule, 7year Rule including young adults who have resided in the UK half of their lives:

Paragraph 276ADE provides:

“276ADE (1). The requirements to be met by an applicant for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK are that at the date of application, the applicant:

(i) does not fall for refusal under any of the grounds in Section S-LTR 1.1 to S-LTR 2.2. and S-LTR.3.1. to S-LTR.4.5. in Appendix FM; and

(ii) has made a valid application for leave to remain on the grounds of private life in the UK; and

(iii) has lived continuously in the UK for at least 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment); or

(iv) is under the age of 18 years and has lived continuously in the UK for at least 7 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) and it would not be reasonable to expect the applicant to leave the UK; or

(v) is aged 18 years or above and under 25 years and has spent at least half of his life living continuously in the UK (discounting any period of imprisonment); or

(vi) subject to sub-paragraph (2), is aged 18 years or above, has lived continuously in the UK for less than 20 years (discounting any period of imprisonment) but there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country to which he would have to go if required to leave the UK.

In essence, where an Article 8 private and family life claim is raised( whether to be considered within the Immigration Rules or outside on Article 8 exceptional grounds) there is no requirement to make provision for Home office application fees where the Article 8 claim is relied upon:

  • as part of an asylum claim
  • where a migrant is in immigration detention.
  • in an appeal, subject to consent of the Secretary of State being applicable

RED.0002 (ENFORCMENT NON- CHARGED) SECTION 120 NOTICE PROCEDURE

A person can take advantage of RED.0002 (enforcement non-charged) Section 120 Notice, if served by the Home Office. In providing a response to the Notice, no application form need be completed nor application fees be provided by the claimant.

It is important to be aware of the single power of removal provided for in legislation so as to appreciate the significance of RED Notices.

The single power of removal is set out in section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 as amended by the  Immigration Act 2014. It outlines the different circumstances in which notice of liability to removal can be served and guidance on serving RED (Removal, Enforcement and Detention) notices.

Under section 10 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999 a person who requires, but does not have, leave to enter or remain in the UK is liable to removal. No removal decision is required but the person must still be notified of their liability to removal.

Significance of Red Notices

RED notices are used to tell an individual:

  • they are liable to removal
  • the country to which they will be removed

The notices also include:

  • information on the consequences of being in the UK illegally
  • information about any help that might be available to return home
  • a section 120 notice which requires the migrant to raise with the Home Office, as soon as reasonably practicable, any grounds not previously raised as to why they should be allowed to remain in or not be removed from the UK

The migrant has an ongoing duty to raise new grounds under section 120 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 while in the UK without leave.

RED.0002 forms- (enforcement non-charged)

RED.0002 forms are section 120 notices and a reminder notice of the section 120 duty. There are 3 RED.0002 notices, the first 2 forms are section 120 notices, and the third is a reminder notice of the section 120 duty:

1) RED.0002 (charged): used where a person is directed towards making a charged application if they wish to make an article 8 claim (for example they are not detained and there is no operational reason to waive the requirement).

2) RED.0002 (enforcement non-charged): used where a person is not directed towards making a charged application (for example where removals casework are preparing a case for tasking to enforcement, or where a person is detained). If necessary the Home office Caseworker can fill in a time limit for response (for example if while not detained, the person was given 14 days to respond to an earlier section 120, but they are now detained and this period needs to be shortened).

3) RED.0002 (reminder): reminds a person both of their liability to removal and their section 120 duty and may be adapted to refer to either charged or noncharged applications, this may be served at reporting events.

A charged application requires the individual to complete and submit an application form and make provision of the Home office fees before their representations can be considered by the Home Office.

A RED.0002 (enforcement non-charged) Section 120 Notice, once served means that the person to whom it is directed, does not need to make a valid charged application when providing reasons as to why they should be allowed to remain in the UK.  The person may, without more, simply provide documentation relevant to their claim and provide all reasons as to why they should be permitted to remain in the UK and then wait for a decision from the Home Office.

 

Court of Appeal on foreign criminals with British children: threshold of “unduly harsh” test not as high as “very compelling circumstances” test

Posted on by Standard 1

 

HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1176 (04 September 2020) is the latest serving from the Court of Appeal on deportation of non-EEA foreign national criminals.

The judgement is quite lengthy, running to 164paragraphs.

Tedious though it may seem but as always, the exposition and summaries in Court judgements in the complex area of deportation serve as a good reminder of the relevant statutory provisions as well as arising principles.

The Court in HA(Iraq  was concerned with  Family life Exception 2 in Section 117C(5) of Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 and in particular with the meaning of the phrase “unduly harsh”.  There was therefore an issue before the Court about the height of the threshold which the phrase sets.

The Appellants in  HA(Iraq contended that the effect of their deportation on their  British children( and partners) was “unduly harsh” – deportation is not justified if either of the two Exceptions identified in sub-sections (4) and (5) of Section 117C apply. 

Although AH(Iraq)’s focus is  stated to be the unduly harsh test after  KO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53, [2018] 1 WLR 5273, in order to appreciate the significance of the issues raised in AH(Iraq), the entirety of the judgement must be considered, including the discussions on caselaw, the relevant principles on deportation, the  Court’s consideration and conclusions on each of the Appellants.

The summary below sets out the issues that fell within the Court’s considerations:

  • NA(Pakistan) remains the “fullest overall guide” in relation to Part 5A and Part 13 of the Rules  
  • NA(Pakistan) does not say that it will be rare for cases to fall within section 117C (5)
  • Decision makers should be cautious about transposing statements of principle from one statutory context to another
  • Continued authoritative status of caselaw decided under old regime pre Part 5A and associated changes to Rules
  • AH(Iraq)’s analysis of the approach to the unduly harsh test in KO(Nigeria)
  • The word “unduly” does not import a requirement to consider “the severity of the parent’s offence”
  • The underlying concept is of an enhanced degree of harshness sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals in the medium offender category
  • KO(Nigeria) endorsed the Upper Tribunal’s self-direction in MK (Sierra Leone) as to the meaning of unduly harsh
  • It is unfortunate that NA(Pakistan) was not considered by the Supreme Court in KO(Nigeria)
  • AH(Iraq)’s guidance on the meaning of the unduly harsh test
  • HA’s appeal allowed in the Court of Appeal and basis of remittal to the Upper Tribunal
  • Section 117C(5) and the case of a “very much hands-on father”
  • Section 117C(6) – consideration of the “ very compelling circumstances” where the offence is at or near the bottom of the scale of seriousness
  • RA’s appeal allowed in the Court of Appeal and basis of remittal to the Upper Tribunal
  • Section 117C(5) and considerations of  the intrinsic importance of a child’s British citizenship and best interests of the child
  • Section 117C(6) – consideration of the “ very compelling circumstances” and the effect of rehabilitation on re-offending
  • The use of “factual precedents – Tribunal has to make its own evaluation of the particular facts before it
  • A decision that does not give primary consideration to the children’s best interests will be liable to be set aside

 

(1)THE BACKGROUND

Introductory paragraphs 1 to 3 in AH(Iraq) are enough for current purposes to obtain sufficient background to the appeals and the issues in point:

“1. These two appeals have been listed together because they raise similar issues. The Appellants are non-British nationals – both, though this is coincidental, from Iraq – who came to this country many years ago and have lived here ever since. Both are in settled relationships with women of British nationality and have young children who are likewise British citizens. Both committed criminal offences for which they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment of sixteen and twelve months respectively. Those sentences attracted the automatic deportation provisions of section 32 of the UK Borders Act 2007. In both cases the Secretary of State made a deportation order but the Appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal (“the FTT”). The appeals are subject to the terms of Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (in particular section 117C), and Part 13 of the Immigration Rules, of which I give more details below.

2.In both cases the appeals were successful, but the Secretary of State in her turn appealed to the Upper Tribunal (“the UT”). Both appeals were allowed and the decisions directed to be re-made by the UT at a further hearing. ……….The two appeals, together with two others (one of which was MS (Philippines) [2019] UKUT 122 (IAC)), were listed on successive days in order for the UT, in constitutions chaired by the President, to give authoritative guidance on various issues about section 117C arising out of the then recent decision of the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53, [2018] 1 WLR 5273. The decision in RA was the principal vehicle for that guidance, though some points of general application are dealt with in the other decisions.

3.In both cases the UT allowed the Secretary of State’s appeal. In September last year I gave permission to appeal to this Court. I considered that there were arguable grounds of appeal in both cases, but the main reason why I thought that the second appeals test was satisfied was that I believed that this Court should have the opportunity to consider the guidance given by the UT on the issues of general application”.

 

(2)STATUTORY PROVISIONS

  • UK Borders Act 2007 – Sections 32 to 33 on Automatic Deportation
  • – Article 8 of the ECHR :Right to respect for private and family life
  • – Section 55: regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children who are in the United Kingdom
  • the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (“the UNCRC”) – Article 3.1: the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration
  • Part 13 of the Immigration Rules- paragraphs A398 to 400 are headed “Deportation and Article 8”
  • Part 5A of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002- “Article 8 of the ECHR: public interest considerations”. Sections – 117A-117D.  In particular Section 117C in cases concerning the deportation of foreign criminals

 

(3)RELEVANT CASELAW REFERRED TO BY THE COURT OF APPEAL IN AH(IRAQ)

 

(4)RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ON THE “ UNDULY HARSH TEST” AND “THE VERY COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES TEST”

Section 117 provides for the exceptions to deportation, i.e Exception 1 being concerned with private life (based on long residence) and Exception 2 with family life.

Section 117C states:

“………..

(3) In the case of a foreign criminal (‘C’) who has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires C’s deportation unless Exception 1 or Exception 2 applies.

(4) Exception 1 applies where –

(a) C has been lawfully resident in the United Kingdom for most of C’s life,

(b) C is socially and culturally integrated in the United Kingdom, and

(c) there would be very significant obstacles to C’s integration into the country to which C is proposed to be deported.

(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.

(6) In the case of a foreign criminal who has been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of at least four years, the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances, over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2.

 …….”

A “qualifying child” is “a person who is under the age of 18 and who (a) is a British citizen, or (b) has lived in the United Kingdom for a continuous period of seven years or more”.

A “qualifying partner” is “a partner who (a) is a British citizen, or (b) is settled in the United Kingdom (within the meaning of the Immigration Act 1971 …)”.

 

(5)COMPARISON OF THE FAMILY LIFE EXCEPTION TO DEPORTATION IN PARAGRPAH 399 AND THAT IN SECTION 117C(5)

The effect of section 117C is substantially reproduced in paragraphs A398-399A, though in more detail.

Paragraph 399 of the Immigration Rules, contains the equivalent to Exception 2 referred to above, and is described as applying where either the potential deportee:

“(a) … has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a child under the age of 18 years who is in the UK, and

(i) the child is a British Citizen; or

(ii) the child has lived in the UK continuously for at least the 7 years immediately preceding the date of the immigration decision;

And in either case

(a) it would be unduly harsh for the child to live in the country to which the person is to be deported; and

(b) it would be unduly harsh for the child to remain in the UK without the person who is to be deported; …”

Or he

“(b) … has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a partner who is in the UK and is a British Citizen or settled in the UK, and

(i) the relationship was formed at a time when the person (deportee) was in the UK lawfully and their immigration status was not precarious; and

(ii) it would be unduly harsh for that partner to live in the country to which the person is to be deported, because of compelling circumstances over and above those described in paragraph EX.2. of Appendix FM; and

(iii) it would be unduly harsh for that partner to remain in the UK without the person who is to be deported.”

 

(6)NA(PAKISTAN) REMAINS THE “FULLEST OVERALL GUIDE” IN RELATION TO PART 5A AND PART 13 OF THE RULES

As was made clear in HA(Iraq) at paragraph 26 in relation to Part 5A of the 2002 Act and Part 13 of the Rules,  by reference to NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662, [2017] 1 WLR 207:

“………..There have by now been several further decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court applying these provisions and considering some particular points, but NA (Pakistan) remains the fullest overall guide”

As per AH(Iraq) at paragraph 27 in relation to the starting point as to the purpose of the statutory scheme:

“The starting-point is that the purpose of the statutory scheme is to require decision-makers to adopt a structured approach to the article 8 issues raised by the removal of a foreign national – that is, whether it will constitute a disproportionate interference with, and thus a breach of, their article 8 rights –and one which ensures that due weight is given to the public interest. It is no part of its purpose to prevent the proper application of article 8. This is clearly stated in para. 26 of the judgment in NA (Pakistan) and again in para. 38, quoted below. Following from that, the statutory structure is a “complete code” in the sense that the entirety of the proportionality assessment required by article 8 can and must be conducted within it: that point is clearly made in paras. 35 and 36”.

AH(Iraq) continues at paragraph 29 in relation to the effect and application of Section 117( C ):

“Turning specifically to the case of foreign criminals, the effect of section 117C can be summarised as follows:

(A) In the cases covered by the two Exceptions in sub-sections (4)-(5), which apply only to medium offenders, the public interest question is answered in favour of the foreign criminal, without the need for a full proportionality assessment. Parliament has pre-determined that in the circumstances there specified the public interest in the deportation of medium offenders does not outweigh the article 8 interests of the foreign criminal or his family: they are, given, so to speak, a short cut. The consideration of whether those Exceptions apply is a self-contained exercise governed by their particular terms.

(B) In cases where the two Exceptions do not apply – that is, in the case of a serious offender or in the case of a medium offender who cannot satisfy their requirements – a full proportionality assessment is required, weighing the interference with the article 8 rights of the potential deportee and his family against the public interest in his deportation. In conducting that assessment the decision-maker is required by section 117C (6) (and paragraph 398 of the Rules) to proceed on the basis that “the public interest requires deportation unless there are very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”.

AH(Iraq) further states at paragraph 31 as regards the “very compelling circumstances” test:

“The effect of the phrase “very compelling circumstances over and above those described in Exceptions 1 and 2”, and the nature of the exercise required by section 117C (6) as it applies both to medium offenders and to serious offenders, are carefully discussed at paras. 28-34 of NA (Pakistan). It is unnecessary that I quote that discussion in full here, but I should note four points applicable to the case of a medium offender”.

AH(Iraq) also sets out paragraphs 29 and 32 of NA(Pakistan) and concludes at paragraph 33:

“…..Those two passages make clear that, in carrying out the full proportionality assessment which is necessary where the Exceptions do not apply, facts and matters that were relevant to the assessment of whether either Exception applied are not “exhausted” if the conclusion is that they do not. They remain relevant to the overall assessment, and could be sufficient to outweigh the public interest in deportation either, if specially strong, by themselves or in combination with other factors”.

 

(7)NA(PAKISTAN) DOES NOT SAY THAT IT WILL BE RARE FOR CASES TO FALL WITHIN SECTION 117C (5)

At paragraph 34, the Court in AH(Iraq) makes an important observation and clarification by reference to NA (Pakistan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 662, [2017] 1 WLR 207:

“Thirdly, at para. 33 the Court says:

Although there is no ‘exceptionality’ requirement, it inexorably follows from the statutory scheme that the cases in which circumstances are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation will be rare. The commonplace incidents of family life, such as ageing parents in poor health or the natural love between parents and children, will not be sufficient.”

This passage makes a point which appears often in the case-law. But it is important to bear in mind that it is directed at the exercise under section 117C (6). The Court was not saying that it would be rare for cases to fall within section 117C (5)”.

 

(8)DECISION MAKERS SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT TRANSPOSING STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE FROM ONE STATUTORY CONTEXT TO ANOTHER

At paragraph 35 , AH(Iraq) goes on to make another important observation and clarification:

“Fourthly, at para. 34 the Court addresses the relevance of the best interests of any children affected by the deportation of a foreign criminal. It says:

“The best interests of children certainly carry great weight, as identified by Lord Kerr in H (H) v Deputy Prosecutor of the Italian Republic [2012] UKSC 25; [2013] 1 AC 338 at [145]. Nevertheless, it is a consequence of criminal conduct that offenders may be separated from their children for many years, contrary to the best interests of those children. The desirability of children being with both parents is a commonplace of family life. That is not usually a sufficiently compelling circumstance to outweigh the high public interest in deporting foreign criminals. …”

Again, this is a point frequently made in the case-law; but, again, it should be borne in mind that, as the reference to a “sufficiently compelling circumstance” shows, the final sentence relates only to the exercise under section 117C (6)”.

And at paragraph 158:

“,,,,,In the same way, I agree with Underhill LJ’s observations at [34] and [35] that decision-makers should be cautious about transposing statements of principle from one statutory context to another; likewise his consideration at [129] of the limited value of cross-checking outcomes in more or less similar cases. The task of the decision-maker in this respect is to consider the effect of this deportation on this child”.

 

(9)CONTINUED AUTHORITATIVE STATUS OF CASELAW UNDER OLD REGIME PRE PART 5A AND ASSOCIATED CHANGES TO RULES

The Court of Appeal in AH(Iraq) concluded that the caselaw decided under the old regime preceding the coming into force of Part 5A in 2014 and the associated changes to the Rules, may still be authoritative:

“36.I have not so far referred to authorities about the regime which preceded the coming into force of Part 5A in 2014 and the associated changes to the Rules. However, as this Court made clear in Akinyemi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2098, [2020] 1 WLR 1843, (“Akinyemi (no. 2)”) the underlying principles relevant to the assessment of the weight to be given to the public interest and article 8 have not been changed by the introduction of the new regime (see per the Senior President of Tribunals at para. 46). The purpose of the new provisions was to give statutory force, accompanied by some re-wording, to principles which had already been established in the case-law relating to the Immigration Rules. That means that cases decided under the old regime may still be authoritative. We have already seen that this Court in NA (Pakistan) referred to the important observations of Laws LJ in SS (Nigeria) about the weight to be given to the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. It also referred on several occasions to the decision of this Court in MF (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] EWCA Civ 1192, [2014] 1 WLR 544.

37. The most authoritative exposition of the principles underlying the old regime can be found, two years after it had been superseded and even some months later than NA (Pakistan), in the decision of the Supreme Court in Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60, [2016] 1 WLR 4799. It is authoritative on the points of principle underlying both regimes and was so treated in Akinyemi no. 2 (see paras. 46-50). That being so, I should say that I can see nothing in the judgments of the majority inconsistent with the approach taken by this Court in NA (Pakistan) as discussed above. At para. 26 of his judgment Lord Reed summarises the effect of the Strasbourg case-law about foreign criminals, and at para. 33, like this Court in NA (Pakistan), he makes it clear that the factors referred to in those cases need to be taken into account in the assessment of the proportionality of the deportation of foreign offenders (whether or not they are “settled migrants”).

38. Reference to the previous case-law is important for the purpose of a particular point made by the Appellants in these appeals. It will be seen that in para. 32 of its judgment in NA (Pakistan) this Court expresses the test under section 117C (6) as being whether the circumstances relied on by the potential deportee “are sufficiently compelling to outweigh the high public interest in deportation”; and it uses the same formulation in paras. 33 and 34 (see paras. 36-37 above). The Appellants contend that that is the only correct formulation, and that it is dangerous to refer simply to “very compelling circumstances”. It would, to say the least, be surprising if it were wrong to use the very language of the statute; but in any event the position becomes clear when the development of the case-law is understood. This Court in NA (Pakistan) took the language of “sufficiently compelling” from the decision in MF (Nigeria). Paragraph 398 of the pre-2014 Rules had used the phrase “exceptional circumstances”. At para. 42 of its judgment in MF the Court said that that did not mean that a test of exceptionality was to be applied (a point repeated in NA (Pakistan) – see para. 36 above) and continued:

“Rather …, in approaching the question of whether removal is a proportionate interference with an individual’s Article 8 rights, the scales are heavily weighted in favour of deportation and something very compelling (which will be ‘exceptional’) is required to outweigh the public interest in removal [emphasis supplied].”

At para. 46 it expressed the same point slightly differently, referring to “circumstances which are sufficiently compelling (and therefore exceptional) to outweigh the public interest in deportation [again, emphasis supplied]”. The effect is clear: circumstances will have to be very compelling in order to be sufficiently compelling to outweigh the strong public interest in deportation. That remains the case under section 117C (6)”.

 

(10)THE COURT OF APPEAL’S ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACH TO THE UNDULY HARSH TEST IN KO(NIGERIA)

The meaning of “unduly harsh” was considered by the Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] UKSC 53, [2018] 1 WLR 5273

AH(Iraq) observes the following in relation to the judgment in KO(Nigeria), which was led by Lord Carnwarth:

 

The word “unduly” does not import a requirement to consider “the severity of the parent’s offence”:  

The Court in AH(Iraq) observed that the actual issue in KO (Nigeria) was a very specific one, i.e whether  the word “unduly” imports a requirement to consider “the severity of the parent’s offence”.  Although in the course of Lord Carnwarth’s discussion of that issue he also expressed a  view as to the height of the threshold which the phrase “unduly harsh” connotes, that was not his primary focus.

In relation to Section 117C(5), as regards the “balancing of the relative seriousness of the offence”, Lord Carnwarth stated at paragraph 23 in KO(Nigeria):  “On the other hand, the expression ‘unduly harsh’ seems clearly intended to introduce a higher hurdle than that of ‘reasonableness’ under section 117B (6), taking account of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. Further the word ‘unduly’ implies an element of comparison. It assumes that there is a ‘due’ level of ‘harshness’, that is a level which may be acceptable or justifiable in the relevant context. ‘Unduly’ implies something going beyond that level. The relevant context is that set by section 117C (1), that is the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals. One is looking for a degree of harshness going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent. What it does not require in my view (and subject to the discussion of the cases in the next section) is a balancing of relative levels of severity of the parent’s offence, other than is inherent in the distinction drawn by the section itself by reference to length of sentence. Nor (contrary to the view of the Court of Appeal in IT (Jamaica) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 932, [2017] 1 WLR 240, paras 55, 64) can it be equated with a requirement to show ‘very compelling reasons’. That would be in effect to replicate the additional test applied by section 117C (6) with respect to sentences of four years or more.”

Lord Carnwath’s conclusion was that the word “unduly” does not import a requirement to consider “the severity of the parent’s offence”.  The Court stated in AH(Iraq)  that the reason why there is no such requirement is that the exercise required by Exception 2 is “self-contained”:  it is irrelevant whether the sentence was at the top or the bottom of the range between one year and four: as Lord Carnwath said, the only relevance of the length of the sentence is to establish whether the foreign criminal is a medium offender or not.

 

The underlying concept is of an enhanced degree of harshness sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals in the medium offender category:

AH(Iraq) continues at paragraph 44 of its judgement:

“In order to establish that the word “unduly” was not directed to the relative seriousness issue it was necessary for Lord Carnwath to say to what it was in fact directed. That is what he does in the first part of the paragraph. The effect of what he says is that “unduly” is directed to the degree of harshness required: some level of harshness is to be regarded as “acceptable or justifiable” in the context of the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals, and what “unduly” does is to provide that Exception 2 will only apply where the harshness goes beyond that level. Lord Carnwath’s focus is not primarily on how to define the “acceptable” level of harshness. It is true that he refers to a degree of harshness “going beyond what would necessarily be involved for any child faced with the deportation of a parent”, but that cannot be read entirely literally: it is hard to see how one would define the level of harshness that would “necessarily” be suffered by “any” child (indeed one can imagine unusual cases where the deportation of a parent would not be “harsh” for the child at all, even where there was a genuine and subsisting relationship). The underlying concept is clearly of an enhanced degree of harshness sufficient to outweigh the public interest in the deportation of foreign criminals in the medium offender category”.

 

KO(Nigeria) endorsed the Upper Tribunal’s self-direction in MK (Sierra Leone) as to the meaning of unduly harsh:

It was also observed that Lord Carnworth stated as follows at paragraph 27 of KO(Nigeria):

“Authoritative guidance as to the meaning of ‘unduly harsh’ in this context was given by the Upper Tribunal (McCloskey J President and UT Judge Perkins) in MK (Sierra Leone) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 223 (IAC), [2015] INLR 563, para 46, a decision given on 15 April 2015. They referred to the ‘evaluative assessment’ required of the tribunal:

‘By way of self-direction, we are mindful that “unduly harsh” does not equate with uncomfortable, inconvenient, undesirable or merely difficult. Rather, it poses a considerably more elevated threshold. “Harsh” in this context denotes something severe, or bleak. It is the antithesis of pleasant or comfortable. Furthermore, the addition of the adverb “unduly” raises an already elevated standard still higher.’

In relation to this the Court in AH(Iraq) stated at paragraph 45 of its judgement:

“It is clear that by describing it as “authoritative” Lord Carnwath means to endorse the UT’s self-direction in MK (Sierra Leone), which is consistent with his own explanation of the effect of “unduly” at para. 23. He goes on to note that that self-direction was followed in the later case of MAB (USA) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] UKUT 435”.

 

Unfortunate that NA(Pakistan) was not considered by the Supreme Court in KO(Nigeria):

As regards the relationship between NA(Pakistan) and KO(Nigeria), the Court of Appeal in AH(Iraq) clarified:

  • The Supreme Court in KO (Nigeria) was concerned only with what was entailed in the assessment of undue harshness for the purpose of section 117C (5) (and paragraph 399 (a)). The appellant relied only on section 117C (5) and did not contend that there were in his case very compelling circumstances over and above Exception 2 which outweighed the public interest in his deportation.
  • It is unsurprising therefore that there is in Lord Carnwath’s judgment in KO(Nigeria) no discussion of section 117C (6) and no reference to NA (Pakistan); but it also slightly unfortunate.
  • There is a risk that, in cases involving a medium offender, tribunals who are directed only to KO(Nigeria) may think that if a potential deportee cannot bring himself within either Exception that is the end of the story. As will be clear from the discussion relating to  NA (Pakistan) that is not the case: it remains necessary in principle to conduct a full article 8 proportionality assessment, albeit one in which the public interest in deportation will only be outweighed in very compelling circumstances.
  • There is a risk that, in cases involving a medium offender, tribunals who are directed only to KO(Nigeria) may think that if a potential deportee cannot bring himself within either Exception that is the end of the story. As will be clear from the discussion relating to  NA (Pakistan) that is not the case: it remains necessary in principle to conduct a full article 8 proportionality assessment, albeit one in which the public interest in deportation will only be outweighed in very compelling circumstances.
  • Although the two-stage exercise described in NA (Pakistan) is conceptually clear, it may occasionally make the analysis unnecessarily elaborate.  There may be cases where a tribunal is satisfied that there is a combination of circumstances, including but not limited to the harsh effect of the appellant’s deportation on his family, which together constitute very compelling reasons sufficient to outweigh the strong public interest in deportation, but where it may be debatable whether the effect on the family taken on its own (as section 117C (5) requires) is unduly harsh.  (An equivalent situation could arise in relation to Exception 1: there might, say, be significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in the country to which it is proposed to deport him, but it might be questionable whether they were very significant.) In such a case, although the tribunal will inevitably have considered whether the relevant Exception has been satisfied, it is unnecessary for it to cudgel its brains into making a definitive finding. The Exceptions are, designed to provide a shortcut for appellants in particular cases, and it is not compulsory to take that shortcut if proceeding directly to the proportionality assessment required by article 8 produces a clear answer in the appellant’s favour.

 

(11)COURT OF APPEAL’S GUIDANCE ON THE MEANING OF THE UNDULY HARSH TEST

As regards the  light to be shed  by references to Lord Carnwarth’s  passages in KO(Nigeria) on the meaning of “unduly harsh” (beyond the conclusion on the relative seriousness issue), the Court in AH(Iraq) concluded as follows between paragraphs 50 to 57 of its judgement:

 

(12)HA’S APPEAL ALLOWED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF REMITTAL TO THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

The Court of Appeal in AH(Iraq) allowed HA’s appeal and remitted the issues under sub-sections (5) and (6) of section 117C to the Upper Tribunal.

In relation to the offence, the Court noted that on 15 March 2010, HA was convicted of assisting unlawful immigration and possessing an unlawfully obtained immigration card, and also of an offence of failing to surrender to custody. He was sentenced to sixteen months’ imprisonment. The circumstances of the primary offences were that he was trying to arrange the illegal entry of his mother and his brother into the UK.

 

Section 117C(5) and the case of a “very much hands-on father”:

As regards Exception 2 in Section 117C(5), the Secretary of State accepted that HA had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British partner and his British children. It was also accepted that it would be unduly harsh for them to relocate with him to Iraq: there was in any event no suggestion that they would accompany him if he were deported. The Upper Tribunal was thus only concerned with whether it would be unduly harsh for them to remain in the UK without him – the “stay scenario”.

The Court of Appeal noted that the Upper Tribunal’s exposition of the factors that it took into account in reaching its conclusion that the effect on HA’s children of his deportation would not be unduly harsh was clear and careful. Nevertheless, the Court came to the conclusion that the Tribunal’s decision could not  be sustained:

 

Section 117C(6) – consideration of the “ very compelling circumstances” where the offence is at or near the bottom of the scale of seriousness:

Although the Court of Appeal noted that if HA eventually succeeded in bringing himself within the terms of section 117C (5) it would be unnecessary for him to rely on section 117C (6), the Court nevertheless dealt with his appeal on this aspect and concluded:

 

(13)RA’S APPEAL ALLOWED IN THE COURT OF APPEAL AND BASIS OF REMITTAL TO THE UPPER TRIBUNAL

As regards the relevant offence, the Court of Appeal noted that on 10 August 2016 RA was convicted, on his plea of guilty, of an offence of under section 4 of the Identity Documents Act 2010 and sentenced to twelve months’ imprisonment. He was sent a forged Iraqi passport by his mother so that he could come and visit her in Iraq. When he presented the passport to the authorities in order to enable him to travel the forgery was detected. The Judge’s very short sentencing remarks acknowledged that RA was of good character but stated that an immediate custodial sentence was necessary because of the nature of the offence. The Judge gave him maximum credit for his guilty plea.

In allowing RA’s appeal and remitting the case to the Upper Tribunal, the Court of Appeal considered as follows:

 

Section 117C(5) and considerations of  intrinsic importance of a child’s British citizenship and best interests of the child:

It was observed that it was conceded in the Upper Tribunal that RA had a genuine and subsisting relationship with his British partner and a subsisting parental relationship with his British child. Accordingly section 117C (5) was engaged, and the question was whether the effect of his deportation would be unduly harsh on his wife and/or his daughter.

 

Section 117C(6) -consideration of the “ very compelling circumstances” and the effect of rehabilitation on re-offending:

The Court of Appeal considered that if RA eventually succeeded in bringing himself within the terms of section 117C (5) it would be unnecessary for him to rely on section 117C (6), however his challenge to the Upper Tribunal’s conclusion raised issues which it was useful for the Court of Appeal to address:

 

The use of “factual precedents – Tribunal has to make its own evaluation of the particular facts before it:

It was noted that RA relied on, and quoted from the decision of the Upper Tribunal in MK (Sierra Leone), where a finding was made at paragraph 42: “We turn to consider the question of whether the Appellant’s deportation would have an unduly harsh effect on either of the two children concerned, namely his biological daughter and his step son, both aged seven years. Both children are at a critical stage of their development. The Appellant is a father figure in the life of his biological daughter. We readily infer that there is emotional dependency bilaterally. Furthermore, there is clear financial dependency to a not insubstantial degree. There is no evidence of any other father figure in this child’s life. The Appellant’s role has evidently been ever present, since her birth. Children do not have the resilience, maturity or fortitude of adults. We find that the abrupt removal of the Appellant from his biological daughter’s life would not merely damage this child. It would, rather, cause a gaping chasm in her life to her serious detriment. We consider that the impact on the Appellant’s step son would be at least as serious. Having regard to the evidence available and based on findings already made, we conclude that the effect of the Appellant’s deportation on both children would be unduly harsh. Accordingly, within the matrix of section 117C of the 2002 Act, ‘Exception 2’ applies.”

It was argued on behalf of RN that the finding in MK (Sierra Leone) that it would be unduly harsh for the appellant’s children to be separated from him was equally applicable in his case, where RA’s child was broadly the same age and at a crucial stage in her development.The Court of Appeal considered whether the “stay scenario” in MK (Sierra Leone) should nevertheless have been treated by the Upper Tribunal in RA’s case as having some kind of authoritative status. The Court however agreed with the Upper Tribunal that it had no such status. Ultimately the tribunal has to make its own evaluation of the particular facts before it. The assessment of “undue harshness” is an evaluative exercise on which tribunals may reasonably differ.

If this kind of factual comparison were legitimate it might indeed be deployed against RA, since in KO(Nigeria) Exception 2 was held not to apply on facts that were at least as close to those of his case as those in MK (Sierra Leone).

 

(14)A DECISION THAT DOES NOT GIVE PRIMARY CONSIDERATION TO THE CHILD’S BEST INTERESTS WILL BE LIABLE TO BE SET ASIDE

Whilst Lord Justice Underhill gave the lead judgment in AH(Iran), Lord Justice Peter Jackson’s supplementary views were as follows:

  • A resulting decision to deport a parent may produce hugely detrimental consequences for a child but, provided his or her best interests have been adequately identified and weighed in the balance as a primary consideration, the decision will be lawful. But a decision that does not give primary consideration to the children’s best interests will be liable to be set aside.
  • The Section 55 duty falls on the decision-maker. A child will not usually be in a position to urge his or her point of view and the decision-maker cannot treat the child as if he or she had some burden of proof.
  • The assessment that has to be carried out is therefore one that is adequately informed and specific to the individual child as a person distinct from the offending parent. It requires the decision-maker, as part of the overall assessment, to look at matters from the child’s point of view – in the case of Exception 2, the question explicitly concerns undue harshness to the child.
  • There are two broad ways in which a decision-maker may inadvertently be deflected from giving primary consideration to the best interests of the child of a foreign criminal. One is by focusing on the position of children generally rather than on the best interests of the individual child. The other is by treating physical harm as intrinsically more significant that emotional harm
  • In order to maintain focus on the individual child, it will be helpful for the decision-maker to apply the words of statutory tests themselves.
  • For some children the deportation of a largely absent parent may be a matter of little or no real significance. For others, the deportation of a close caregiver parent where face to face contact cannot continue may be akin to a bereavement. A decision that gives primary consideration to the best interests of the child will instead focus on the reality of that child’s actual situation and the decision-maker will be more assisted by addressing relevant factors of the kind identified by Underhill LJ in AH(Iraq) at the end of paragraph 56 than by making generalised comparisons
  • The task of the decision-maker in this respect is to consider the effect of this deportation on this child.
  • The other general observation concerned the treatment of emotional harm. Section 31(9) of the Children Act 1989 defines harm as ill-treatment or the impairment of health or physical, intellectual, emotional, social or behavioural development. Reflecting  contemporary understanding of the importance of emotional development and mental health, there is no hierarchy as between physical and non-physical harm. It must therefore always be recognised that for the child the consequences of going with both parents may be experienced as far less harsh than staying with one parent. Despite this, it may be easier for decision-makers to envisage the harm that may be done by expecting a family to experience precarious or even dangerous physical conditions than to factor in at full worth the lifelong emotional harm of terminating the relationship between a child and a close parent during the child’s minority and possibly forever. Both situations are grim but for the child neither is intrinsically grimmer than the other. Provided the decision-maker faces up to the reality of the child’s situation and gives it primary consideration, the public interest in deportation may prevail, but it will not do to minimise the emotional impact on the child of the severing of ties by reference to the doubtful prospect of maintaining relationships over many years by indirect means only, or by reciting the fact that this is what deportation does.

 

CONCLUSION

AH(Iraq) is a most welcome decision following the barrage of negative harsh judgements over the years emanating from the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal on the applicability of the statutory provisions on potential deportees who have British children.

The appeals in HA and RA were allowed as the existing decisions in the Upper Tribunal did not adequately address the circumstances of the children of the foreign criminals in the way that is required under Exception 2 or under the proportionality assessment.  

The Court of Appeal thought it important to emphasis at paragraphs 34, 35 and 52 of its judgement that it should be borne  mind which factors are relevant to the exercise under section 117C (6) and those under section 117C(5) and to emphasise that the Court in NA(Pakistan) was not saying that it would be rare for cases to fall within section 117C (5). At paragraph 158 of AH(Iraq), Peter Jackson LJ agreed with Underhill LJ’s observations at  paragraphs 34 an 35 that decision-makers should be cautious about transposing statements of principle from one statutory context to another.

In practice however, having regard to the nature of decisions from the Secretary  of State made in relation to foreign criminals subject to deportation,  including decisions in the Tribunal, it is difficult to shake off the strong suspicion that the starting and end point has indeed thus far, in the majority of cases, been  that it is rare for cases to fall within section 117C (5).

Whatever may have been discussed during proceedings and how this came about, it is unfortunate that the Court in AH(Iraq) does not delve into issues but appears to abruptly conclude:

“61. I should say, finally, that Mr Pilgerstorfer referred us to a number of decisions of this Court in which KO has been applied – Secretary of State for the Home Department v JG (Jamaica) [2019] EWCA Civ 982; Secretary of State for the Home Department v PF (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 1139; Secretary of State for the Home Department v PG (Jamaica) [2019] EWCA Civ 1213; CI (Nigeria) Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 2027; and Secretary of State for the Home Department v KF (Nigeria) [2019] EWCA Civ 2051. These have mostly turned on issues peculiar to the particular case and none has called for the kind of analysis required by the grounds of appeal argued before us. I have found nothing in any of them inconsistent with what I have said above.”

Having regard to the Court of Appeal’s approach and clarifications in  AH(Iraq),  for those cases which have gone through the appeal system and been dismissed, it may be that  further submissions by way of an application to revoke the extant deportation order may be in order, supplemented by strong new or updated evidence, for example, supportive relevantly prepared detailed school reports and/or an effective independent social workers report.

As usual, following  key judgements in the Supreme Court or Court of Appeal, the Upper Tribunal will in the next few weeks or months seek  in  future test cases(s) to grapple with the principles and interpretation of the statutory provisions arising in AH(Iraq).  The Court of Appeal’s judgment is lengthy and makes somewhat complex reading however broken down, it deals with several issues that usually arise in practice in deportation appeals- a subsequent reported judgement from the Upper Tribunal should not be convoluted but serve to clarify.