Despite the Court of Appeal’s guidance in AM (Zimbabwe) & Anor v The Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWCA Civ 64 as regards the test in paragraph 183 of Paposhvili, it is obvious that there is still some unfinished judicial business yet to be resolved. This is evident as the Court in AM was ultimately at pains to stress that it was, “ highly desirable that the Supreme Court should consider the impact of Paposhvili for the purposes of domestic law at an early stage”. The Court had been urged by the appellants not express any view about the true meaning and effect of the guidance in Paposhvili, and in particular regarding the test in paragraph 183 of the judgment in that case: the contention was that the Court should not venture to do this, but should simply apply the law as laid down domestically by the House of Lords in N v Secretary of State for the Home Department and dismiss the appeals, with a view to granting permission to apply to the Supreme Court. It was argued that since the Court of Appeal was bound to dismiss the appeals, anything that Court said about the new test in Paposhvili would be obiter and would not provide assistance for other courts or tribunals. The Court of Appeal ploughed ahead nonetheless and made it clear that, “We are providing authoritative guidance on the true interpretation of a legal criterion governing how courts and tribunals in the domestic legal system should make judgments regarding the exercise of their powers to grant stays of removal. That guidance will be formally binding upon courts and tribunals below the level of the Supreme Court, in the usual way”.
In an unusual case, concerning a foreign national criminal, where the effect of deportation was intended to separate mother from British child, in MG, R (On the Application Of) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department  EWHC 31 (Admin) , the Administrative Court concluded that the Secretary of State’s refusal to treat the Claimant’s submissions in relation to her relationship with her daughter as a fresh claim in light of the evidence submitted was irrational and should be quashed and re-taken.
Paragraph 289A, Part 6 of Appendix Armed Forces and section DVILR of Appendix FM of the Immigration Rules allow those who have leave in the UK as the partner of someone with the right of permanent residence and whose relationship has genuinely broken down, because of domestic violence, during their probationary period of leave, to be granted indefinite leave to remain.
To qualify for indefinite leave to remain as a victim of domestic violence the applicant must meet the requirements set out in Part 8 of the Immigration Rules or Appendix FM or Appendix Armed Forces to those Rules.
On 15 January 2018, the Immigration Act 2016 (Commencement No. 7 and Transitional Provisions) Regulations 2017 No. 1241, commenced Sections 61(1) and (2) and 66 of the 2016 Act and the majority of the immigration bail provisions set out in Schedule 10 to the 2016 Act.
Schedule 10 replaced the various pre-existing alternatives to detention (temporary admission, temporary release on bail and release on restrictions) by a single power to grant immigration bail.
Following commencement of the provisions in Schedule 10, any person at liberty in the community on the basis of one of the previous alternatives to detention provisions is now to be treated as having been granted immigration bail, subject to the same conditions, under the single bail power. Accompanying the new provisions is new Guidance, Immigration bail.
Banks and building societies are not permitted to open current accounts for persons in the United Kingdom who require leave to enter or remain but do not have it.
The Secretary of State’s position is that such persons should not be provided with access to banking services.