Tag Archives: Zimbabwean asylum seekers: Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Opposition to government Version 5.0 September 2021

Does the new country Information Note make it that much more difficult for Zimbabwean asylum claimants to succeed in their protection claims?

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The Home Office has published a new Note, Country Policy and Information Note Zimbabwe: Opposition to government Version 5.0 September 2021, www.assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1018765/ZWE_CPIN_Opposition_to_the_government.pdf

In summary, the following can be gathered from the 59page document:

  • Human rights violations in Zimbabwe are carried out by state agents (police and army) and state proxies (ZANU-PF)
  • As regards the MDC-A and MDC-T factions, views from political analysts are that the ruling party created the surrogate opposition MDC-T to disturb the MDC-Alliance
  • Those at risk of persecution include MDC supporters, teachers, health professionals, journalists, students, lawyers and civil society activists
  • There has been a decline in the human rights situation under Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency
  • In relation to levels of human rights violations, there are no “very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from existing country guidance of CM(Zimbabwe)
  • the majority of protests were peaceful and no cases recorded excessive use of force against protesters in recent years
  • In relation to civil society activists and NGO’s, security authorities are suspicious of the motivations of CSOs and see their activities as a threat to national stability
  • As regards politicisation of food and other aid, this is not in and of itself serious enough by its nature and repetition to establish a claim to asylum
  • In relation to internal relocation, the guidance in CM (Zimbabwe) continues to govern internal relocation considerations

WHO CARRIES OUT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN ZIMBABWE? – carried out by state agents (police and army) and state proxies (ZANU-PF)

  • The majority of human rights violations are carried out by state agents (police and army) and state proxies (ZANU-PF), although a significant minority of violations involve unknown perpetrators. During 2020 and the first half of 2021, the police were the main perpetrators of recorded violations. The median proportion of violations committed by the police has increased from 29% in 2019 to 51% at the mid-point of 2021. Over the same period, the proportion of violations attributed to ZANU-PF has fallen from 35% to 19%. It is likely that COVID-19 lockdown restrictions, combined with the role of the police in enforcing the restrictions, has contributed to this trend – Para 2.4.4
  • Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution from the state or proxies of the state, they will not, in general, be able to avail themselves of the protection of the authorities- Para 2.5.1

MDC-A AND MDC-T FACTIONS: The ruling party created the surrogate opposition MDC-T to disturb the MDC-Alliance

The main opposition political party, the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) has undergone a series of internal splits which began before the death of its leader Morgan Tsvangirai (in February 2018) and which continued after his death. The 2 current factions, the MDC-A and MDC-T, have engaged in infighting – Para 2.4.2

On 7 January 2021, The Africa Report, describing itself as ‘one of the leading news organisations on the continent’48 (published by Jeune Afrique Media Group) set out the consequences of the factional dispute for the MDC:

While the year 2020 will undoubtedly play an integral part in history – bringing the world to a halt as a result of the pandemic – Zimbabwe’s politics will go down as an historic year for the Movement for Democratic Change, once a united front, now split into two: MDC-Alliance led by Nelson Chamisa, and MDC-T, led initially by Thokozani Khupe and now by Douglas Mwonzora………….

‘The opposition is clearly facing a serious challenge from an authoritarian regime, the ruling party Zanu-PF, that hopes to crush and fragment the opposition, inevitably destroying multi-party democracy in Zimbabwe, says UK-based Zimbabwean political analyst Alex Magaisa.

‘“The ruling party created the surrogate opposition MDC-T to essentially disturb the MDC-Alliance. It is not a fight between factions in the opposition, but a fight by the ruling party against the opposition to dismantle it and move towards a one-party regime,” Magaisa tells The Africa Report…

Thabitha Khumalo, MDC-Alliance national chairperson, describes events that affected the opposition party in 2020 as the death of democracy in Zimbabwe. Zanu-PF found a willing partner in the MDC-T to destroy the bigger objective of the opposition in favour of individuals who were open to benefitting from such a system.

‘Khumalo says: “The MDC is working with the ruling party to stifle democracy in the country. Zanu-PF is motivated to dismantle the opposition, for them they would rather have a one- party state and they have found a willing partner through the MDC-T.”’-  Para 11.1.4

WHO IS AT RISK OF PERSECUTION? -MDC supporters, teachers, health professionals, journalists, students, lawyers and civil society activists

  • The ruling party is intolerant of organisations or persons who speak out against the government. Members of opposition political parties, such as the MDC, and other opposition groups, including civil society activists, journalists and health professionals, have been arrested or assaulted- Para 2.4.3
  • Over the 2-year period between August 2019 and July 2021, the median percentage of victims of human rights violations recorded as having a known MDC-affiliation was 3.1%. Given that approximately 10% of Zimbabweans are members of the MDC and the MDC presidential candidate received 44% of votes cast in the 2018 election, the figure of 3.1% is likely to be an underestimate. The low proportion of recorded MDC-affiliated victims may be explained by a reluctance of victims to be identified as linked to the MDC-Para 2.4.16
  • In 2020, ZPP recorded 2,825 human rights violations. Given the large numbers of MDC supporters and members, compared against the relatively low number of recorded violations, the risk of being a victim of a violation based solely upon being a supporter or member of the MDC is very low- Para 2.4.18
  • However, violations against persons who are affiliated with the MDC do take place. Many of the reported arrests, abductions and assaults involve MDC leaders and activists with a significant profile-Para 2.4.19
  • In the case of teachers, in CM (Zimbabwe) the UT held that ‘Those who are or have been teachers require to have their cases determined on the basis that this fact places them in an enhanced or heightened risk category, the significance of which will need to be assessed on an individual basis.’ (paragraph 3(10))- 2.4.21
  • As well as teachers, other groups which have been critical of the government include: health professionals, journalists, students, lawyers and civil society activists. Many of the recorded incidents are linked to involvement in (or, in the case of journalists, coverage of) demonstrations protesting against pay, working conditions and living costs. Recorded violations include arrest, assault, detention and abduction – Para 2.4.22
  • Being a teacher, lawyer, journalist, health professional, student or civil society activist does not, in itself, establish a risk of persecution or serious harm. Each case must be considered on its individual merits. Factors to take into account include the person’s profile, activities, area of origin and proposed area of return. The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they face a risk of persecution- Para 2.4.23
  • The USSD human rights report covering events in 2020 noted: ‘There were reports of individuals arrested for political reasons, including opposition party officials, their supporters, NGO workers, journalists, civil society activists, and labor leaders. Authorities sometimes detained such individuals for one or two days and released them without charge. Political prisoners and detainees did not receive the same standard of treatment as other prisoners or detainees, and prison authorities arbitrarily denied visitor access to political prisoners. There were reports police beat and physically abused political and civil society activists while they were in detention. ‘Unlike normal criminal proceedings, which move from investigation to trial within months, prosecuting agents regularly took abnormally long to submit for trial cases involving members of the political opposition or civil society critics of the government. Hearings were sometimes scheduled when presiding judges were on vacation. Prosecutors in political cases were often “unprepared to proceed” and received numerous continuances. In many cases where authorities granted bail to government opponents, they did not conclude investigations and set a trial date but instead chose to “proceed by way of summons.” This left the threat of impending prosecution remaining, with the accused person eventually being called to court, only to be informed of further delays.’- Para 15.1.1
  • In December 2019, DFAT reported: ‘On the night of 14 September 2019, Dr Peter Magombeyi, the head of the Zimbabwe Hospital Doctors Association disappeared from his home. Dr Magombeyi subsequently reappeared on 20 September, after the government issued a statement of concern for his apparent abduction. Dr Magombeyi required ongoing hospitalisation after his return, with friends and colleagues alleging he had been poisoned during his abduction. Dr Magombeyi’s involvement in the ongoing industrial action by doctors and nurses through 2018-19… led to widespread allegations that his abduction was state-orchestrated. ‘The full facts of the recent abductions remain unclear, including the identity of the perpetrators. While the government’s statement of concern in relation to Dr Magombeyi is a positive development, the government has yet to fully demonstrate its commitment to apprehending and prosecuting those responsible for the abductions, or to preventing any further incidents.’ – Para 16.4.1
  • In February 2020, Newsday reported: ‘Six parents and teachers in Mutoko were arrested on Thursday after staging a protest against the deterioration of standards in the education sector, before handing a copy of their grievances to government. ‘The protest, which occurred at Mutoko Centre, shocked many as it was one of the few to be held within a Zanu PF stronghold. ‘Some of those arrested were members of the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe.’- Para 16.4.2
  • A September 2020 ZHRNGOF report which focused on COVID-related human rights violations stated: ‘Not less than 35 nurses were arrested by State security agents for taking part in a strike over poor salaries and for demanding COVID-19 allowances during the lockdown. The disgruntled nurses were, however, released without charge following the intervention of the hospital leadership. The striking nurses were rounded up at Mutare General Hospital on June 19 [2020] and taken to Mutare Central Police Station.’- Para 16.4.3

DECLINE IN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION -decline in human rights situation under Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency

  • In December 2020, the International Crisis Group produced a briefing based on a range of sources: ‘Three years after a coup ended Robert Mugabe’s rule, the situation in Zimbabwe has gone from bad to worse, as political tensions mount, the economy falls apart and the population faces hunger and COVID-19. Having signalled a desire to stabilise the economy and ease repression, President Emmerson Mnangagwa has disappointed. The state is arresting opponents who protest government corruption and incompetence. Meanwhile government-allied businessmen are tightening their grip on what is left of the economy, while citizens cope with austerity measures and soaring inflation. Violence and lawlessness are on the rise. Fearing major unrest, or even another coup sparked by ruling-party divisions, Zimbabwe’s most important neighbour, South Africa, is ditching its tolerant posture toward Harare.’ – Para 3.1.2
  • In a January 2021 publication covering the events of 2020, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported ‘Zimbabwe’s human rights situation continued to decline in 2020 under Emmerson Mnangagwa’s presidency. Unidentified assailants, suspected to be state security agents, abducted and tortured more than 70 critics of the government during 2020. Security forces also continued to commit arbitrary arrests, violent assaults, abductions, torture and other abuses against opposition politicians, dissidents and activists.’ – Para 3.1.3
  • In a March 2021 report covering the events of 2020, Freedom House stated: ‘The Zimbabwe African National Union–Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has dominated Zimbabwean politics since independence in 1980, in part by carrying out severe and often violent crackdowns on the political opposition, critical media, and other sources of dissent. President Emmerson Mnangagwa took power in 2017 after the military intervened to remove longtime president Robert Mugabe amid factional divisions within the ruling party. However, the new administration has largely retained the legal, administrative, and security architecture it inherited from the Mugabe regime, and it has stepped up repression to consolidate its authority- Para 3.1.5
  • In July 2021, the UK Government’s Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) published its annual report (covering the events of 2020) and stated: ‘The human rights situation in Zimbabwe did not improve in 2020. The human rights monitoring group, Zimbabwe Peace Project, recorded 2,825 human rights violations in 2020, similar to the total in 2019. The majority of violations were due to heavy-handed policing of COVID-19 regulations by the Zimbabwe Republic Police, as well as targeted abductions, arbitrary arrests, and detentions linked to planned protests in July.’- Para 3.1.6

LEVELS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS-  no “very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from existing country guidance of CM(Zimbabwe)

  • In order to understand the level and nature of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, and also to identify trends over time, this CPIN has drawn upon data collected by two organisations: the Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP) and the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)- Para 5.1.1
  • ZPP and ACLED have been chosen for several reasons. Firstly, their information is publicly available and easily accessible. Secondly, their approach to cataloguing data is different, thereby widening the type of analysis which can be performed. Most importantly, both sources provide a systematic log of violations and events over a continuous time period. (ZPP produces consecutive monthly reports, while ACLED logs events daily). This means that the information collected by the two sources is more quantifiable than other pieces of evidence, such as reports and articles, which are often piecemeal in coverage. The ZPP and ACLED data can therefore be used alongside the qualitative evidence to provide a more complete picture of the current situation and also provide context to how the situation has changed over time- Para 5.1.2
  • The level of human rights violations across Zimbabwe has remained relatively constant throughout 2019, 2020 and 2021. The Zimbabwe Peace Project (ZPP), a local NGO, recorded 2,790 violations in 2019, 2,825 violations in 2020 and 1,264 violations during the first 6 months of 2021, which is less than half of the 2019 and 2020 totals. Recorded violations range from harassment/intimidation (the large majority) to assault, unlawful detention and unlawful killing – Para 2.4.5
  • In the case of CM (EM country guidance; disclosure) Zimbabwe CG [2013] UKUT 00059 (IAC), heard in October 2012 and promulgated in January 2013, (which modified the Country Guidance in EM and Others (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2011] UKUT 98 (IAC), heard in October 2010/January 2011 and promulgated in March 2011), the Upper Tribunal found that there was significantly less politically-motivated violence in Zimbabwe than had been described in the earlier country guidance case of RN (Returnees) Zimbabwe CG [2008] UKAIT 00083, heard by the Asylum Immigration Tribunal in September/October 2008 and promulgated in November 2008, which followed the violently contested 2008 national elections – Para 2.4.10
  • ZPP data indicates that the recorded level of human rights violations in 2020 and 2021 is significantly lower than the level recorded in 2008 (when RN was heard), lower than 2010 (when EM was heard) and lower than 2012 (when CM was heard). The ZPP recorded a total of 2,825 human rights violations in the most recent full year for which data is available (2020). This is just over a quarter of the 10,703 incidents in 2010 and just over half of the figure of 5,096 in 2012. The 2020 figures are also much lower than the 23,755 incidents recorded in 2008. During the first half of 2021, the ZPP recorded 1,264 violations, which is less than half of the 2020 total of 2,825- Para 2.4.11
  • The overall trend of human rights violations documented by ZPP is broadly consistent with information from ACLED. The number of events recorded by ACLED during the same 4 years noted above (2008, 2010, 2012 and 2020) are 775, 194, 202 and 162, respectively. Whilst neither ZPP nor ACLED are likely to record every human rights violation or every event in any particular year, the data provides an indication of the scale and nature of violence annually and is comparable against itself year-on-year, so provides an indication of trends over time. The general trend is of a steep decline in incidents after 2008, followed by a more gradual decline or plateauing of incidents between 2009 and 2020. While spikes in violence do take place – such as during the fuel protests in 2019 – this has not affected the overall trend – Para 2.4.12
  • The ZPP data indicates that for each year, 2014 to 2020, inclusive, the total number of human rights violations recorded was lower than that for 2011 (when EM was promulgated) and also lower than 2013 (when CM (Zimbabwe) was promulgated). The ACLED data fluctuates between 2011 and 2020 but the overall trend is of little change, with the number of events recorded in 2020 falling in between the figures for 2011 and 2013- Para 9.1.3
  • Given the absence of ‘very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence’ to depart from existing country guidance, (as per paragraph 47 of SG (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] EWCA Civ 940 (13 July 2012)) the findings of CM (Zimbabwe) continue to apply:……- Para 2.4.20

PROTESTS- the majority of protests were peaceful and no cases recorded excessive use of force against protesters in recent years

While some protests were organised by the MDC, or had the party’s support, protests were also organised by other groups or organisations – Para 12.1.1

Mid-year data for 2021 has not been included in the graph. For the 6-month period between 1 January 2021 and 30 June 2021, a total of 16 protests were recorded by ACLED. This is less than a third of the total number of protests recorded in 2019 (52) and 2020 (52). Of the 16 protests, 13 were peaceful, 3 involved an intervention and there were no instances of excessive force being used against protesters- Para 9.3.4

A CPIT review of the graph, together with the mid-year 2021 figures, indicates several points:

  • There has been a trend towards an increasing number of protests over the period 2010 to 2020. The total number of protests recorded in 2010 and 2020 were 19 and 52, respectively, with the number of protests peaking at 97 in 2015.
  • The data also shows that for each year in the 11-year period 2010 to 2020, the majority of protests were peaceful and – with the exception of a spike in 2011 – the percentage of protests in which the state intervened remained relatively constant at about 30%.
  • In the 2 most recent full years, 2019 and 2020, and also the mid-year period between 1 January 2021 and 30 June 2021, there were no cases recorded by ACLED of excessive use of force against protesters – Para 9.3.5

In July 2021, the FCDO’s annual report (covering the events of 2020) stated: ‘In July [2020], authorities took pre-emptive and heavy-handed action to prevent large-scale protests. These were fuelled by growing frustration following corruption scandals, imploding healthcare provision, and the collapsing economy. The authorities detained opposition politicians and journalists for encouraging participation in such protests, and cases against journalist Hopewell Chin’ono, and opposition politicians Job Sikhala and Jacob Ngarivhume, were continuing at the end of the year. The Government continued to use the legal system to silence critics, suppress opposition and discourage protest.’- Para 12.1.9

On 24 July 2020 the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) issued a statement: ‘We are concerned at allegations in Zimbabwe, which suggest that the authorities may be using the COVID-19 pandemic as a pretext to clamp down on freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly and association… While recognizing the Government’s efforts to contain the pandemic, it is important to remind the authorities that any lockdown measures and restrictions should be necessary, proportionate and time[1]limited, and enforced humanely without resorting to unnecessary or excessive force.’ Para 13.1.2

In the August 2021 edition of its monthly monitoring report, ZPP noted: ‘In Muzarabani [Mashonaland Central], police allegedly continued to deny the MDC Alliance clearance to hold meetings due to lockdown regulations but Zanu PF was holding its meetings regularly without disturbances.’ – Para 13.1.6

CIVIL SOCIETY ACTIVISTS & NGO’S-  Security authorities are suspicious of the motivations of CSOs and see their activities as a threat to national stability

  • In December 2019, DFAT reported: ‘Unconfirmed statements by government officials put the number of [civil society organisations] CSOs operating in Zimbabwe at over 20,000. CSOs conduct activities on a wide range of social, cultural, political, and economic issues. A number of domestic and international NGOs investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases… Security authorities reportedly remain suspicious of the motivations of CSOs and see their activities as a threat to national stability, particularly in the wake of the January 2019 fuel protests. Following these protests, authorities charged an unprecedented 22 people (including prominent CSO leaders and activists) with subverting a constitutional government, which carries a penalty of up to 20 years’ imprisonment. At least 10 individuals face treason charges, for which the death penalty is applicable… After the aborted August 2019 protests in Harare, authorities reportedly arrested 128 activists in Harare and an undisclosed number nationwide.’ – Para 16.3.1 I
  • In a March 2021 report covering the events of 2020, Freedom House stated: ‘NGOs face restrictions under laws including the CLCRA and the Private Voluntary Organisations Act, despite rights laid out for them in the constitution. NGO leaders and members faced detentions, abductions, and continued scrutiny in 2020.’- Para 16.3.2
  • Online news site Bloomberg reported on 4 August 2020: ‘Protests against economic turmoil, arrests and human-rights abuses in Zimbabwe have moved online with a hashtag that’s plays on the #BlackLivesMatter movement. The #ZimbabweanLivesMatter tag started after security forces blocked a street demonstration last week… President Emmerson Mnangagwa labeled [sic] the planned street protests an “insurrection” meant to topple his administration. In a televised speech on Tuesday, he said “dark forces” within and outside the country were undermining economic recovery. “The bad apples that have attempted to divide our people and to weaken our systems will be flushed out,” he said.’ – Para 16.3.3
  • In an address to ZANU-PF members on 14 July 2021, reported by the government-owned Herald news site, President Mnangagwa said: ‘As the election season unfolds, we are observing a notable number of NGOs diverting from their operational mandates to delve into political matters, that amounts to interference in the internal affairs of our sovereign country. ‘My Government will not brook any such disregard for our laws and will proceed to de-register all organisations found in the wrong.’- Para 16.3.8

POLITICISATION OF FOOD AND OTHER AID- not in and of itself serious enough by its nature and repetition to establish a claim to asylum

  • Incidents of partisan distribution of aid continue to take place and ZPP recorded a number of cases of politically-motivated restrictions on access to food and other aid. However, the number of recorded incidents is low, with a total of 270 incidents across Zimbabwe in 2019 and 258 in 2020, largely in rural areas. Incidents of food and aid violations in Harare and Bulawayo are rare. In 2019, 95% of food and aid violations took place outside of Harare and Bulawayo. In 2020 this figure was 96%. There are also processes in place to lodge objections against the unfair distribution of aid-Para 2.4.24
  • Such treatment would not in and of itself be serious enough by its nature and repetition to establish a claim to asylum – Para 2.4.25
  • A March 2021 report by ZHRNGOF and ZPP stated: ‘The ruling party ZANU-PF exerts undue influence over local government structures, such as Provincial Administrators, District Administrators and the Department of Social Welfare, which are involved in the distribution of food aid at local levels. This opens food aid distribution processes to political interference from ruling party functionaries such as local party leaders and activists, as well as war veterans and youth militias aligned to the party. The partisan control and distribution of aid enables ZANU-PF to bolster its electoral support whilst also punishing villagers who voted for opposition councillors. This significantly undermines the right to food for people who are perceived to be members or supporters of the opposition.’ – Para 14.1.6
  • And: ‘There are mechanisms in place to handle complaints from people who have grievances about the distribution of food aid, including handling complaints about the partisan distribution of aid. There are also monitoring mechanisms put in place to check for partisan distribution of aid, but this has somehow not worked efficiently as shown in the discussions above. On the government side, there are monitoring teams from the national, provincial and district levels who are supposed to monitor food aid distribution and to investigate complaints raised at the respective ward distribution centres. District social welfare departments also handle and investigate complaints, but this has not been very successful given the overbearing influence of ZANUPF structures over local government structures, as discussed above. There are instances where people who have been discriminated against receiving food aid on partisan lines have raised complaints to local social welfare officers and they were ultimately given their food aid packages. But, in most instances, affected villagers choose not to complain for fear of being victimized by either village heads or ZANU-PF activities in their communities. ‘On the other hand, NGOs have more effective monitoring systems and complaints handling (feedback) mechanisms that they use before, during and after food distribution exercises. Most NGOs have established help desks in food aid distribution areas which are manned by their field officers. They also set up suggestion boxes and toll-free numbers where aggrieved villagers can lodge complaints anonymously. The NGO field teams collect the complaints and they go on to investigate them. If the teams find out that there are villagers who have not been included on beneficiary lists, they go on to correct the anomaly ensure that deserving villagers receive their food aid packages… ‘The NGO monitoring and complaints mechanisms are effective in terms of providing remedies and redress to people discriminated against during food aid distribution. But they can only work if the affected people are confident enough to use the mechanisms and they are not afraid of being victimized after they raise complaints.’- Para 14.1.7

INTERNAL RELOCATION- guidance in CM (Zimbabwe) continues to govern internal relocation considerations

In CM (Zimbabwe), restating EM, the UT held:

‘The issue of what is a person’s home for the purposes of internal relocation is to be decided as a matter of fact and is not necessarily to be determined by reference to the place a person from Zimbabwe regards as his or her rural homeland. As a general matter, it is unlikely that a person with a well[1]founded fear of persecution in a major urban centre such as Harare will have a viable internal relocation alternative to a rural area in the Eastern provinces. Relocation to Matabeleland (including Bulawayo) may be negated by discrimination, where the returnee is Shona.

‘Internal relocation from a rural area to Harare or (subject to what we have just said) Bulawayo is, in general, more realistic; but the socio-economic circumstances in which persons are reasonably likely to find themselves will need to be considered, in order to determine whether it would be unreasonable or unduly harsh to expect them to relocate.’ (paras 3(7) and (8))- Para  2.6.2

In summary:

  • In general, it is unlikely that a person with a well-founded fear of persecution in a major urban centre, such as Harare or Bulawayo, will reasonably be able to relocate to a rural area in the eastern provinces
  • In general, internal relocation from a rural area to Harare or Bulawayo is reasonable. In the case of the Shona ethnic group, relocation to Matabeleland (including Bulawayo) may not be reasonable, as they may face discrimination.
  • In all cases, the socio-economic circumstances of relocation need to be considered to decide whether relocation would be unreasonable or unduly harsh -Para 2.6.3

Conclusion

As always, each asylum claim will be decided having regard to individual circumstances.

Despite a current reported reduction in the levels of human rights violations in Zimbabwe, in light of the repressive nature of the regime, its intolerance of criticism or expression of other political affiliation, a claim for protection may succeed where a claimant can establish on the basis of some or all of the following that they:

  • have a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason
  • are a critic or are perceived as such by the regime
  • are an active member of the opposition ( MDC-A faction) or perceived as such
  • are involved in protest against the regime
  • belong to a profession that falls within a risk category as above
  • will be of adverse interest to state agents
  • will be identified on arrival at the airport
  • will be interrogated or detained and subject to ill treatment at the airport and are unable to internally relocate