she could not lawfully require JM under section 35 of the Asylum and iImmigration (Treatment of Claimants) Act 2004 to tell officials at the Zimbabwean Embassy that he agreed voluntarily to return to Zimbabwe; and
that he was entitled to substantial damages against the Secretary of State for unlawful immigration detention between 15 July 2014 and 25 May 2016 (save for the period between 21 April and 6 September 2015 when he was serving a sentence of imprisonment).
“It is very depressing. The law has been clear for the best part of 50 years ………It should go without saying, but I fear there is need to spell out what ought to be obvious ……So far as I am aware, none of these principles have ever been challenged or doubted. Is it too much to demand that people pay more attention to them?”, so queried the President of the Family Division in apparent exasperation in The Secretary of State for the Home Department v GD (Ghana) (Rev 1)  EWCA Civ 1126 (25 July 2017). This was said during the course of seeking to reiterate the effect of family court orders in deportation and removal cases.
The Court of Appeal could not help but observe that the case presented the unusual situation where both the Appellant and the Secretary of State agreed that there was an error in the Country Guidance Case, AA (Article 15(c)) Iraq CG  UKUT 544 (IAC).
The parties agreed before the Court of Appeal that the appeal should be allowed albeit on a narrow ground.
Disappointingly in this case, the First Tier Tribunal permitted itself to be persuaded by the Home Office to grant permission to appeal in relation to an Immigration Judge’s decision allowing the Appellant’s Article 8 appeal.
Ironically, the same Home Office Guidance on private life which the Secretary of State relied upon and which formed the basis of grant of permission, was utilized to the Appellant’s benefit in the Upper Tribunal – although neither the presenting officer nor myself at the First Tier Tribunal hearing referred to it all. The Immigration Judge made no reference to the guidance in her decision when allowing the Appellant’s appeal.